Enrile's Speech in the Corona Impeachment

The vote of the Senate President
HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE
On Article II of the Articles of Impeachment against Hon. Chief Justice Renato C. Corona

* * *

In the entire course of this impeachment trial, I have faced many difficult challenges to my own and the Court’s collective wisdom, our sense of justice and fairness, the delicate balancing act we must perform to ensure that we do not stray from the strictures of the Constitution, the law and our rules.

This trial began and unfolded against the backdrop of a highly charged and emotional atmosphere, acrimonious debate in and outside the confines of this Court, and a deep political fissure which threatened the stability of our democratic institutions.

But the impact of the many events that transpired since December 12 last year to this very day, taken altogether, cannot compare to the sense of heaviness that I feel at this very moment.

The culmination of this national drama is at hand, and the time has come for me to render judgment on the person before whom I took my Oath of Office as a Senator of the Republic…no less than the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Renato C. Corona.

The Respondent Chief Justice and his family understandably feel deeply hurt, pained and aggrieved.

As a lawyer, I must confess that I was personally frustrated by the loose and hasty crafting and preparation that characterized the presentation of the charges contained in the Articles of Impeachment. It seemed that the case was being built up only after the charges were actually filed. The repeated recourse to this Court’s compulsory processes to obtain evidence which normally should have formed the factual basis of the charges in the first place further burdened and, at times, taxed the patience of this Court.

We have witnessed with disdain the indiscriminate, deliberate and illegal machinations of some parties who have been less than forthright with this Court in presenting dubiously procured and misleading documents which were spread to the media obviously to influence this Court’s and the public’s opinion.

The letter of the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority which contained, as an attachment, a list of 45 properties supposedly owned by the Respondent Chief Justice, was fed to the media even before we could begin the actual trial of this case.

Even before the Hon. Ombudsman, Conchita Carpio Morales, was called to testify before this Court, her letter to the Chief Justice requiring him to explain in 72 hours an alleged aggregate amount of US$10M in several dollar accounts was leaked to the media right before the resumption of this trial last May 7.

We have sternly cautioned against unethical and unprofessional conduct, the penchant to engage in trial by publicity, to use the media to disseminate and advance so called “information” or “evidence”, to provoke and disrespect this Court and its members, and to irresponsibly hurl disparaging insinuations and accusations.

We have tried to impress upon everyone who may be similarly motivated and inclined to test our will that this Court means serious business and would not succumb to nor allow such underhanded tactics and gimmickry to deter us from our task.

Prudence and justice dictate that in determining the guilt or innocence of the Chief Justice, we must try our best to confine ourselves to the pieces of testimonial and documentary evidence that have been presented to this Court, to pass upon their relevance, and to measure and weigh their value in the light of the charges before us.

After all the accusations levelled against the Chief Justice – eight (8) charges in all comprising the Articles of Impeachment – the Prosecution chose to present evidence only on three Articles (Articles II, III and VII), and abruptly rested its case.

I have always believed that of these three, the case for the Prosecution and the Defense will rise or fall on Article II, which is the subject of this vote.

This Court, at one point, had extensive discussions and differences of opinion, to be sure, regarding the charge contained in Paragraph 2.4 of Article II that the Chief Justice was “suspected and accused of having accumulated ill-gotten wealth, acquiring assets of high values and keeping bank accounts with huge deposits”.

We ruled to disallow the introduction of evidence in support of Par. 2.4 which, to this day, I strongly maintain was an invalid charge, it being based on mere “suspicion”, on so-called “reports”, rather than on factual allegations.

The Defense and the Chief Justice himself somehow revived this issue of the nature of his assets by introducing evidence to prove that his income and assets were legitimate, and by testimony to show how he and his wife had saved and invested these savings in foreign currency over so many decades.

I wish to reiterate, for the record, that the Chief Justice does not stand accused of having amassed any ill-gotten wealth before this Impeachment Court.

Paragraph 2.2 of Article II of the Articles of Impeachment accuses the Respondent Chief Justice of failing to disclose to the public his statement of assets, liabilities and net worth as required by the Constitution.

I submit that the Chief Justice had justifiable and legal grounds to rely on the Supreme Court’s procedural and policy guidelines governing such disclosures as embodied in a Resolution promulgated way back in 1989 when the Respondent was not yet a Member of the Supreme Court.

Under the said guidelines, the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court, who is the repository of the SALN’s submitted by all the Members of the Supreme Court, may furnish copies of the SALN’s in his or her custody to any person upon request, and upon showing that there is a legitimate reason for the same.

The Constitution, in Article XI, Sec. 17, states that “in the case of the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional offices, and offices of the armed forces with general or flag rank, the declaration shall be disclosed to the public in the manner provided by law”.

R.A. 6713, known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, recognizes the public’s right to information on the assets, liabilities, net worth, financial and business interests of public servants. But it likewise declares it unlawful for any person “to obtain or use the same for purposes contrary to morals or public policy or for any commercial purpose other than by news and communications media for dissemination to the general public”.

Whether the said guidelines violate the letter and spirit of R.A. 6713 and the principle of public accountability is not for this Court to pass upon. I grant that the Chief Justice believed in good faith that after periodically filing his sworn Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth, the guidelines issued by the Supreme Court were sufficient to allow the Clerk of Court to comply with the Constitution and the law.

We cannot ignore the fact that the failure or refusal, particularly of public officials in high government positions, to provide the public or the media with copies of the SALN’s, continues to be a raging issue to this day. In fact, some, if not most of the members of the Prosecution panel itself, the Members of the Supreme Court, members of Congress and other high officials of the government have been challenged by media organizations to make their SALN’s available to the public and to the media.

Paragraph 2.3 of Article II further accuses the Respondent Chief Justice, based on “reports”, of not including some properties in his declaration of his assets, liabilities, and net worth, in violation of the anti-graft and corrupt practices act.

The Prosecution, based on the list it procured from the LRA, claims that the Chief Justice owned and failed to fully disclose in his SALN 45 real estate assets. Based on the evidence, I am convinced that the Defense has presented credible evidence to refute this charge and to explain the exclusion in the Respondent Chief Justice’s SALN’s of certain properties which have either been sold or legally transferred, properties which are actually owned by his children and/or third parties, and properties which were never owned by the Respondent in the first place.

I am likewise convinced that the Defense has sufficiently established that there was no ill intention on the part of the Respondent to understate or misrepresent the value of his real properties.

Proceeding now to the most significant charge involving the non-disclosure of the Respondent Chief Justice’s cash assets, the Ombudsman, at the instance of the Defense, testified with a presentation of a report from the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC), showing 82 bank accounts allegedly belonging to the Respondent.

She further testified that based on her analysis of the report, aided by the Commission on Audit, the Chief Justice had cash assets in the examined bank accounts of anywhere from US$10 Million to US$ 12 Million.

Even if we grant the existence of these 82 accounts, the amount of deposits corresponding to each of these could not just easily, fairly or logically be summed up to arrive at exactly how much cash assets or deposits, in actuality and in totality, the Respondent Chief Justice had or has at any given point in time.

Hence, the Ombudsman’s reference to a “transactional balance” of about US$12 Million should not mislead this Court in its appreciation of the facts.

Regrettably, both the Prosecution and the Defense panels decided not to present the concerned bank officers or the AMLC to ascertain the veracity of the data allegedly provided by the AMLC to the Office of the Ombudsman, despite the Respondent’s submission to this Court of a written waiver to cause the opening of all his bank accounts. Laudable as this belated act on the part of the Respondent Chief Justice may be, it would have served him better if he had just presented bank documents as evidence to either confirm or refute the documents showing his bank transactions as presented by the Ombudsman. It has not escaped this Presiding Officer that initially, last May 22nd to be exact, before he walked out of the halls of this Court, the Chief Justice signed the said waiver in open court but made the release of the same conditional, that is, after all the 188 signatories to the Articles of Impeachment and Senator-Judge Franklin Drilon have signed a similar waiver. It was only during the hearing last May 25 that the Chief Justice decided to submit the waiver to the Court without any conditions.

Moreover, even as the Chief Justice had full access to his own bank accounts and all the opportunity to introduce evidence to disprove the data, findings and analysis presented by the Ombudsman or the report of the AMLC, the Defense did not introduce any such evidence.

As it is, the Impeachment Court could only rely on the documents supplied by the Ombudsman which show the Respondent’s bank transactions but which do not show the actual bank balances of Respondent’s bank accounts.

Instead, the Defense presented the Chief Justice himself as its last witness and pleaded for the Court’s permission to allow the Respondent to deliver an “opening statement”.

This Court, out of courtesy to the Chief Justice, decided to extend its understanding and to exercise liberality in granting the request.

The long narration, where the Chief Justice touched on a wide range of issues, assertions of facts, accusations, opinions and personal sentiments, which the Respondent said he found necessary to narrate in order to clear his and his family’s name, was later adopted by the Defense as the direct testimony of the Respondent. The Prosecution, on the other hand, waived its right to cross-examine the Chief Justice, provided the Defense would not conduct any further direct examination.

Nevertheless, the Respondent Chief Justice testified and admitted, in answer to questions from a member of this Court, that he had around P80 Million in 3 Peso accounts and US$2.4 Million in 4 US Dollar accounts, but that he had purposely not declared these assets for 2 reasons: (1) That his Peso accounts represented “co-mingled funds”, and (2) That he was not required to report or declare his foreign currency deposits in his SALN because they were absolutely confidential under R.A. 6426.

I disagree on both counts.

If, indeed, any of the Respondent’s cash deposits were co-mingled with the funds belonging to other parties such as the Basa Guidote Enterprises, Inc. (BGEI) or his children, the Respondent was still duty bound to declare these deposits in his SALN, they being admittedly under his name.

The evidence is devoid of any indication that the Chief Justice was holding these funds in trust for or that they were actually beneficially owned by any one other than himself or his wife.

Assuming that any part of such deposits in truth belonged to third parties, the Respondent could have indicated such third-party funds as corresponding liabilities in his SALN. That would have reflected his real net worth.

With all due respect, I believe that the Respondent Chief Justice’s reliance on the absolute confidentiality accorded to foreign currency deposits under Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426 is grossly misplaced.

The Constitution, in Article XI, Sec. 17, provides that “A public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of office and as often as may be required by law, submit a declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities and net worth. x x x ”

Are we now to say that this Constitutional command is limited to a public official’s assets or deposits in local currency? If so, would we not be saying, in effect, that the Constitution allows something less than a full, honest and complete disclosure?

It bears noting that the prescribed form of the SALN quite simply requires public officers and employees to declare their assets, real and personal, the latter to include cash and bank deposits, bonds, etc. It does not require the public officer or employee to indicate whether or not he or she has foreign currency notes or deposits. Neither does it require details such as account numbers, account names, bank identity nor any branch address. All that it requires is a declaration of the total amount of the funds deposited in any bank account or accounts maintained by the public official or employee concerned.

Surely, the Chief Justice knows the equivalent value in local currency of his foreign currency deposits to be able to declare the same as part of his assets, especially since the aggregate amount of these foreign currency deposits, by his own account, amounts to US$2.4 Million.

The non-disclosure of these deposits, in both local and foreign currency, would naturally result in a corresponding distortion of the Chief Justice’s real net worth.

Consistent with the position taken by this Court in the case filed by the Philippine Savings Bank before the Supreme Court last February, pursuant to which the Supreme Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order, I maintain that the Constitutional principle of public accountability overrides the absolute confidentiality of foreign currency deposits.

The provisions of R.A. 6426 cannot be interpreted as an exception to the unequivocal command and tenor of Article XI, Sec. 17, of the 1987 Constitution, and I regret that the Highest Magistrate of the land, no less, would think otherwise.

Section 8 of R.A. 6426 provides that except with the written permission of the depositor, “in no instance shall foreign currency deposits be examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government official, bureau or office whether judicial or administrative or legislative or any other entity whether public or private.”

The so-called conflict of laws between R.A. Nos. 6713 and 6426 is more illusory than real. Section 8 of R.A. No. 6426 merely prohibits the examination, inquiry or looking into a foreign currency deposit account by an entity or person other than the depositor himself. But there is nothing in R.A. No. 6426 which prohibits the depositor from making a declaration on his own of such foreign currency funds, especially in this case where the Constitution mandates the depositor who is a public officer to declare all assets under oath.

Some have raised the question: Why should the Chief Justice be held accountable for an offense which many, if not most others in Government are guilty of, perhaps even more than he is? They say that hardly anyone declares his true net worth anyway.

Here lies what many have posited as a moral dilemma. I believe it is our duty to resolve this “dilemma” in favor of upholding the law and sound public policy. If we were to agree with the Respondent that he was correct in not disclosing the value of his foreign currency deposits because they are absolutely confidential, can we ever expect any SALN to be filed by public officials from hereon to be more accurate and true than they are today?

I am not oblivious to the possible political repercussions of the final verdict we are called upon to render today. I am deeply concerned that the people may just so easily ignore, forget, if not completely miss out, the hard lessons we all must learn from this episode, instead of grow and mature as citizens of a democratic nation.

Those whose intentions and motivations may be farthest from the lofty ideals of truth and justice are wont to feast upon this man’s downfall should this Court render a guilty verdict.

I am equally aware of the tremendous pressure weighing heavily upon all the members of this Court as we had to come to a decision on this case, one way or the other.

But to render a just verdict according to my best lights and my own conscience is a sacred duty that I have sworn to perform.

As one who has been through many personal upheavals through all of my 88 years, I, too, have been judged, often unfairly and harshly. But I have constantly held that those who face the judgment of imperfect and fallible mortals like us have recourse to the judgment of history, and, ultimately, of God.

And so, with full trust that the Almighty will see us through the aftermath of this chapter in our nation’s history, I vote to hold the Chief Justice, Renato C. Corona, GUILTY as charged under Article II, Par. 2.3, and that his deliberate act of excluding substantial assets from his sworn Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth constitutes a culpable violation of the Constitution.

my 2010 photo with former chief justice R.Puno with the sticker "NO TO MIDNIGHT CHIEF JUSTICE"

 (After 43 trial days and hundreds of grueling hours of hearing, the Senate sitting as impeachment court have declared Chief Justice Renato Corona guilty May 29, 2012. 

The Impeachment trial's "hear no evil" fiasco, who is wrong?

"Then you’re not from UP. Then you cannot equate yourself to          me because there is a saying and I know this, not all law students      are created equal, not all law schools are created equal, not all             lawyers are created equal despite what the Supreme Being that we        all are created equal in His form and substance."

These are the statements that prompted Atty. Melvin D.C. Mane to   charge Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen of Branch 36, RTC Calamba City, of “demeaning, humiliating and berating” him during the hearing on February 27, 2006 because he is a "MLQU" graduate.

The  Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)  earlier ruled that  "Respondent judge’s insulting statements which tend to question complainant’s capability and credibility stemming from the fact that the latter did not graduated [sic] from UP Law school is clearly unwarranted and inexcusable. When a judge indulges in intemperate language, the lawyer can return the attack on his person and character, through an administrative case against the judge, as in the instant case."A judge’s official conduct and his behavior in the performance of judicial duties should be free from the appearance of impropriety and must be beyond reproach. A judge must at all times be temperate in his language.

On its Decision dated June 30, 2008, in A.M. No. RTJ-08-2119,  the Supreme Court  imposed upon the erring judge the penalty of reprimand under the following principle.

 "An alumnus of a particular law school has no monopoly of knowledge of the law. By hurdling the Bar Examinations which this Court administers, taking of the Lawyer’s oath, and signing of the Roll of Attorneys, a lawyer is presumed to be competent to discharge his functions and duties as, inter alia, an officer of the court, irrespective of where he obtained his law degree.  For a judge to determine the fitness or competence of a lawyer primarily on the basis of his alma mater is clearly an engagement in an argumentum ad hominem. A judge must address the merits of the case and not on the person of the counsel.  If respondent felt that his integrity and dignity were being “assaulted,” he acted properly when he directed complainant to explain why he should not be cited for contempt.  He went out of bounds, however, when he, as the above-quoted portions of the transcript of stenographic notes show, engaged on a supercilious legal and personal discourse.  This Court has reminded members of the bench that even on the face of boorish behavior from those they deal with, they ought to conduct themselves in a manner befitting gentlemen and high officers of the court Judges should always be aware that disrespect to lawyers generates disrespect to them. There must be mutual concession of respect. Respect is not a one-way ticket where the judge should be respected but free to insult lawyers and others who appear in his court. Patience is an essential part of dispensing justice and courtesy is a mark of culture and good breeding. If a judge desires not to be insulted, he should start using temperate language himself; he who sows the wind will reap a storm.It is also noticeable that during the subject hearing, not only did respondent judge make insulting and demeaning remarks but he also engaged in unnecessary “lecturing” and “debating”. . .Thus, it is our view that respondent judge should shun from lecturing the counsels or debating with them during court hearings to prevent suspicions as to his fairness and integrity."

          

A revisit on  above ruling is very timely due  to the incident that occurred last week as a member of the Senate, Miriam Santiago, used abusive language in an impeachment proceeding, on live TV, and no one in the Senate has raised issue over her actuations. By placing his cupped hands over his “hurt ears” while in full view of cameras,prosecutor Vitaliano Aguirre II caught the ire of Santiago. However, he lectured back to the lecturing legislator, telling Santiago “If you demand respect, respect also these lawyers because human dignity has no equal.”

A posting from the facebook group  "You Know You are from UP LAW"  said  that "If the Philippine Senate were made of men and women of character, Miriam Santiago should have been  slapped with a disciplinary action at the same time that Aguirre of the hear-no-evil fame was held for contempt. Is the Senate any better -- or any worse -- than than the Supreme Court in protecting its own? Actions speak louder than words. It's really about who holds the power. In this country, as current history shows, those who hold the most power -- in the Executive, Legislative and Judicial branches of government -- treat that power as something to be abused as a matter of right."

In May 2007, the Supreme Court in A.M. No. RTJ-05-1955 admonished a judge to “maintain composure and equanimity” and “always be temperate, patient and courteous both in conduct and language” because “as a dispenser of justice” a judge “should exercise judicial temperament at all times, avoiding vulgar and insulting language.A judge, even on the face of boorish behavior from those he deals with, ought to conduct himself in a manner befitting a gentleman and a high officer of the court.”

Another posting i saw was from the October 15th Episode of The People's ,Court  Judge Milian gives a University of Miami law student a piece of her mind after he disrespects her.

Supreme Court decision on a Nestle trademark case on confusing similarity on milk products

It is FINAL. The Supreme Court has denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by our opposing counsel in    favorable decision of the Court  on a Nestle trademark case on confusing similarity on milk products.. I personally handled the appeal case in the CA and SC level...

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/august2010/172276.htm

Nestle owns the “NAN” trademark for its line of infant powdered milk products, consisting of PRE-NAN, NAN-H.A., NAN-1, and NAN-2.  NAN is classified under Class 6 — “diatetic preparations for infant feeding.” Respondent Martin  Dy, Jr. owns 5M Enterprises.  He imports Sunny Boy powdered milk from Australia and repacks the powdered milk into three sizes of plastic packs bearing the name “NANNY.”  NANNY is is also classified under Class 6 — “full cream milk for adults in [sic] all ages.”  Dy, Jr. distributes and sells the powdered milk in Dumaguete, Negros Oriental, Cagayan de Oro, and parts of Mindanao.



Applying the dominancy test in the present case, the Court finds that "NANNY" is confusingly similar to "NAN.""NAN" is the prevalent feature of Nestle's line of infant powdered milk products. It is written in bold letters and used in all products. The line consists of PRE-NAN, NAN-H.A., NAN-1, and NAN-2. Clearly, "NANNY" contains the prevalent feature "NAN." The first three letters of "NANNY" are exactly the same as the letters of "NAN." When "NAN" and "NANNY" are pronounced, the  aural effect is confusingly similar.

NANNY and NAN have the same classification, descriptive properties and physical attributes.  Both are classified under Class 6, both are milk products, and both are in powder form.  Also, NANNY and NAN are displayed in the same section of stores — the milk section.

The Court agrees with the lower courts that there are differences between NAN and NANNY: (1) NAN is intended for infants while NANNY is intended for children past their infancy and for adults; and (2) NAN is more expensive than NANNY.  However, as the registered owner of the “NAN” mark, Nestle should be free to use its mark on similar products, in different segments of the market, and at different price levels.   

The scope of protection afforded to registered trademark owners is not limited to protection from infringers with identical goods. The scope of protection extends to protection from infringers with related goods, and to market areas that are the normal expansion of business of the registered trademark owners.

SC acquits Webb, 6 others in viszonde massacre

Hubert Webb and six others convicted for the highly publicized Vizconde massacre almost two decades ago walked off the national penitentiary as free men after the Supreme Court acquitted them based primarily on inconsistent testimonies of state witness Jessica Alfaro during trial.
 

Voting 7-4, the High Court ruled that the Paranaque regional trial court erred when it handing down in Jan. 2000 the guilty verdict on Webb, Hospicio "Pyke" Fernandez, Antonio "Tony Boy" Lejano, Michael Gatchalian, Peter Estrada, Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez and Gerardo Biong for the crime of rape with homicide.

The High Court overturned the verdict of Paranaque RTC Branch 274 Judge and now CA Justice Amelita Tolentino, which was upheld by the Court of Appeals on Dec. 15, 2005 and had sentenced the primary accused to life imprisonment.

The dispositive portion of said decision states ( http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/december2010/176389.htm )

"In our criminal justice system, what is important is, not whether the court entertains doubts about the innocence of the accused since an open mind is willing to explore all possibilities, but whether it entertains a reasonable, lingering doubt as to his guilt. For, it would be a serious mistake to send an innocent man to jail where such kind of doubt hangs on to one’s inner being, like a piece of meat lodged immovable between teeth.

Will the Court send the accused to spend the rest of their lives in prison on the testimony of an NBI asset who proposed to her handlers that she take the role of the witness to the Vizconde massacre that she could not produce?

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the Decision dated December 15, 2005 and Resolution dated January 26, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. 00336 and ACQUITS accused-appellants Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio Lejano, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio Fernandez, Miguel Rodriguez, Peter Estrada and Gerardo Biong of the crimes of which they were charged for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. They are ordered immediately RELEASED from detention unless they are confined for another lawful cause.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director, Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City for immediate implementation. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is DIRECTED to report the action he has taken to this Court within five days from receipt of this Decision.

SO ORDERED." 

Six magistrates concurred in the ruling: Associate Justices Conchita Carpio-Morales, Diosdado Peralta, Lucas Bersamin, Jose Perez, Jose Mendoza and Ma. Lourdes Sereno.

The Court used as basis for its conclusion "inherent inconsistencies" in the testimony of Alfaro, saying she was just an asset of the NBI. "There is another thing about a lying witness: her story lacks sense or suffers from inherent inconsistencies.  An understanding of the nature of things and the common behavior of people will help expose a lie.  And it has an abundant presence in this case."

The four other magistrates inhibited from the case - Senior Associate Justice Antonio Carpio and Associate Justices Mariano del Castillo, Presbitero Velasco Jr. and Antonio Eduardo Nachura - due to either earlierinvolvement in the case or relation to either of the parties.