Narita Rabe vs. Delsa Flores

(Most of the Senator judges cited the case of the court interpreter Delsa Flores who  was dismissed from service in an en banc decision by the Supreme Court dated May 14, 1997with her retirement benefits and leave credits forfeited and was also blocked from being employed by any government agency and corporation. But it was not just about the statement of assets, liabilities, and net worth (SALN) that Flores violated. She was dismissed for dishonesty, for still collecting from the Municipal Government when she was already employed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 4. Here is the full text of the decision).

EN BANC
[A.M. No. P-97-1247.  May 14, 1997.]
(Formerly A.M. OCA I.P.I. 1 No. 95-71-P)
NARITA RABE, complainant, vs. DELSA M. FLORES, Interpreter III, RTC, Branch IV, Panabo, Davao, respondent.
Edgar D. Rabor for complainant.

SYLLABUS
1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; PUBLIC EMPLOYEES; MISCONDUCT; STEALING; CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED BY DIRE FINANCIAL NEED AND FORGETFULNESS. — Respondent's overriding need for money from the municipal government, aggravated by the alleged delay in the processing of her initial salary from the Court, does not justify receipt of a salary not due her. If poverty and pressing financial need could justify stealing, the government would have been bankrupt long ago. A public servant should never expect to become wealthy in government. And if respondent was just driven by dire pecuniary need, respondent should have returned the salary she had obtained from the Municipal Government of Panabo as soon as she obtained her salary from the court. However, she returned the money only after receipt of the Court's Resolution saying that she forgot all about it. Forgetfulness or failure to remember is never a rational or acceptable explanation.

2. ID.; ID.; COURT PERSONNEL; PROPER DECORUM; VIOLATED IN CASE AT BAR. — It is well to stress once again the constitutional declaration that a "(p)ublic office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives." We have repeatedly held that although every office in the government service is a public trust, no position exacts a greater demand for moral righteousness and uprightness from an individual than in the judiciary. Personnel in the judiciary should conduct themselves in such a manner as to be beyond reproach and suspicion, and free from any appearance of impropriety in their personal behavior, not only in the discharge of their official duties but also in their everyday life. They are strictly mandated to maintain good moral character at all times and to observe irreproachable behavior so as not to outrage public decency. Respondent's malfeasance is a clear contravention of the constitutional dictum that the State shall "maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and effective measures against graft and corruption."

3. ID.; ID.; DISHONESTY; PROPER PENALTY IS DISMISSAL. — Under the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of EO No. 292 known as the "Administrative Code of 1987" and other pertinent Civil Service Laws, the penalty for dishonesty is dismissal, even for the first offense. For respondent's dishonesty in receiving and keeping what she was not lawfully entitled to, this Court has the duty to impose on her the penalty prescribed by law; dismissal.

4. ID.; ID.; REPUBLIC ACT 6713; OBLIGATION TO DISCLOSE BUSINESS INTEREST; CASE AT BAR. — Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6713 provides that it is the "obligation"' of an employee to submit a sworn statement, as the "public has a right to know" the employee's assets, liabilities, net worth and financial and business interests. Section 11 of the same law prescribes the criminal and administrative penalty for violation of any provision thereof. Paragraph (b) of Section 11 provides that "(b) Any violation hereof proven in a proper administrative proceeding shall be sufficient cause for removal or dismissal of a public official or employee, even if no criminal prosecution is instituted against him." In the present case, the failure of respondent to disclose her business interest which she herself admitted is inexcusable and is a clear violation of Republic Act No. 6713. We do not find her administratively liable, however, for failure to divest herself of the said interest. The requirement for public officers, in general, to divest themselves of business interests upon assumption of a public office is prompted by the need to avoid conflict of interests. In the absence of any showing that a business interest will result in a conflict of interest, divestment of the same is unnecessary. In the present case, it seems a bit far-fetched to imagine that there is a conflict of interest because an Interpreter III of the Regional Trial Court has a stall in the market. A court, generally, is not engaged in the regulation of a public market, nor does it concern itself with the activities thereof. While respondent may not be compelled to divest herself of her business interest, she had the legal obligation of divulging it.

D E C I S I O N
Narvasa, C .J ., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban, and Torres, Jr., JJ ., concur.

PER CURIAM p:

In an administrative complaint for "Conduct Unbecoming a Government Employee, Acts Prejudicial to the Interest of the Service and Abuse of Authority" dated August 18, 1995, Complainant Narita Rabe, 2 by counsel, charged Respondent Delsa M. Flores, Interpreter III at the Regional Trial Court, Branch IV, Panabo, Davao, as follows: 3
"(Mrs.) Flores took advantage of her position as a court employee by claiming a stall at the extension of the Public Public (sic) Market when she is (sic) not a member of our client's association and was never a party to Civil Case No. 89-23. She herself knows (sic) that the stalls in the said area had already been awarded to our client's members pursuant to the decision of the court on October 30, 1991. Worse, she took the law into her hands when she destroyed the stall of our client and brought the materials to the police station of Panabo, Davao."

After respondent filed her answer, the Court issued a Resolution dated January 17, 1996, absolving her of the charge. In the same resolution, however, the Court required respondent to explain why she should not be administratively dealt with for the following: 4
". . . a) why she obtained a certification dated June 18, 1991 issued by Atty. Victor R. Ginete, Clerk of Court, same court, that she started performing her duties as (an) interpreter on May 16, 1991 when (1) according to a certification dated June 17, 1991 issued by Mr. Jose B. Avenido, Municipal Treasurer, Panabo Davao, she was employed in the office of the Municipal Assessor as Assessment Clerk I since February 1, 1990 to June 3, 1991 with her last salary being paid by said office on June 3, 1991; and (2) she took her oath of office before Judge Mariano C. Tupas only on June 17, 1991;
b) why she did not report said business interest in her sworn statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth, Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial Connections, and Identification of Relatives in the Government Service for the years 1991, 1992, 1993, and 1994;
c) why she has not divested herself of her interest in said business within sixty (60) days from her assumption into (sic) office; and
d) why she has indicated in her DTRs for August 1995 that she worked on August 15-18, 21, 23-25 and 28-31 and for September, 1995 that she worked for all its twenty one (21) working days when her Contract of Lease with the Municipal Government of Panabo for the market stall in its Section 7 clearly states that she has to personally conduct her business and be present at the stall otherwise the same would be canceled as per its Section 13."

Respondent Flores, in a letter dated February 13, 1996, explains that, as stated in the certification of Atty. Ginete, she assumed her job in the Regional Trial Court, Branch IV, Panabo, Davao on May 16, 1991, in compliance with the directive from this Court for her to start working on the said date. Respondent further states that "even prior to said date (May 16, 1991)" she already reported to the court in order to familiarize herself with the scope of her duties. 5

Respondent Flores also admits that she had received from the municipality a salary for the period May 16 1991 — May 31, 1991, notwithstanding her transfer to the judiciary on May 16, 1991. She submits, however, the following justification: 6

"I admit that I received my last salary in the amount of One Thousand and 80/100 (P1,000.80) Pesos from the Local Government Unit from May 16-31, 1991 but farthest from my mind is the intent to defraud the government. It was my desire all the time to refund the amount the moment my salary is received from the Supreme Court, unfortunately more often than not (the salary) is received three or four months after assumption of office. As we all know the month of May and June is the time we enroll our children in school thus the money I got that month from the Local Government Unit came handy in defraying registration expenses of my four children. The passage of time coupled with some intervening events, made me oblivious of my obligation to refund the money. However, when my attention was called on the day I received the copy of the resolution, I took no time in refunding the same."

Respondent alleges that the certification of Municipal Treasurer Jose V. Avenido is inaccurate because it was on January 25, 1990 that she was appointed as Assessment Clerk I. 7 According to respondent, she took her oath on June 17, 1991, simply because it was on that date that she received a copy of her oath form. 8

Respondent avers that she did not divulge any business interest in her Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Financial Disclosure for the years 1991-1994 because she "was never engaged in business during said period although I had a stall in the market." 9

Respondent further avers that her Daily Time Record indicated that she held office on August 15, 18, 21, 23 to 25 and 28, 31 and all the working days of September, 1995 "because in truth and in fact . . . (she) did hold office on those days." This was because her contract of lease with the Municipal Government of Panabo was never implemented as it became the subject of "Civil Case No. 95-53 — Panabo Public Market Vendors Assn. Inc. and Pag-ibig Ng Gulayan Ass. Inc. vs. Municipality of Panabo, et al., for Declaration of Nullity of Mun. Ord. No. XLV, Series of 1994." 10

The Court referred the matter to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation. In its report, the OCA found respondent guilty of dishonesty and failure to report her business interest, and recommended that the penalty of dismissal be imposed on her. The Court finds that the report and recommendation of the OCA is in accord with the evidence and the law. We hold the explanation of respondent unsatisfactory. Respondent's misconduct is evident from the records.

By her own admission, respondent had collected her salary from the Municipality of Panabo for the period of May 16-31, 1991, when she was already working at the RTC. She knew that she was no longer entitled to a salary from the municipal government, but she took it just the same. She returned the amount only upon receipt of the Court Resolution dated January 17, 1996, or more than five (5) years later. We cannot countenance the same. Respondent's conduct is plain dishonesty.

Her explanation, as observed earlier, is unsatisfactory. Her overriding need for money from the municipal government, aggravated by the alleged delay in the processing of her initial salary from the Court, does not justify receipt of a salary not due her. We sympathize with respondent's sad plight of being the sole breadwinner of her family, with her husband and parents to feed and children to send to school. This, however, is not an acceptable excuse for her misconduct. If poverty and pressing financial need could justify stealing, the government would have been bankrupt long ago. A public servant should never expect to become wealthy in government.

But there is really more to respondents' defense of poverty. If respondent was just driven by dire pecuniary need, respondent should have returned the salary she had obtained from the Municipal Government of Panabo as soon as she obtained her salary from the court. However, she returned the money only after receipt of the Court's Resolution dated January 17, 1996, saying that she forgot all about it. Forgetfulness or failure to remember is never a rational or acceptable explanation.

In Macario Flores vs. Nonilon Caniya, Deputy Sheriff, RTC, Imus, Cavite, 11 this Court ruled that a sheriff who failed to issue an official receipt for the money entrusted to him for the purpose of satisfying a judgment debt, "had really wanted to misappropriate the said amount." Inevitably, he was dismissed from service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and accrued leave credits, with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.

It is well to stress once again the constitutional declaration that a "(p)ublic office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives." 12

We have repeatedly held that although every office in the government service is a public trust, no position exacts a greater demand for moral righteousness and uprightness from an individual than in the judiciary. Personnel in the judiciary should conduct themselves in such a manner as to be beyond reproach and suspicion, and free from any appearance of impropriety in their personal behavior, not only in the discharge of their official duties but also in their everyday life. They are strictly mandated to maintain good moral character at all times and to observe irreproachable behavior so as not to outrage public decency. 13

This Court, in JPDIO vs. Josephine Calaguas, Records Officer, OCC, MTCC, Angeles City, 14 held:
"The Court must reiterate that a public office is a public trust. A public servant is expected to exhibit, at all times, the highest degree of honesty and integrity and should be made accountable to all those who he serves."

Respondent's malfeasance is a clear contravention of the constitutional dictum that the State shall "maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and effective measures against graft and corruption." 15

Under the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of EO No. 292 known as the "Administrative Code of 1987" and other pertinent Civil Service Laws, the penalty for dishonesty is dismissal, even for the first offense. 16 Accordingly, for respondent's dishonesty in receiving and keeping what she was not lawfully entitled to, this Court has the duty to impose on her the penalty prescribed by law: dismissal.

Apart from the above finding, we also note the contradiction between the certification issued by Municipal Treasurer Jose Avenido stating that respondent had worked as an assessment clerk in his office up to June 3, 1991, and the certification of Clerk of Court Victor Ginete stating that respondent started working as an interpreter on May 16, 1991. Although specifically asked by the Court to explain this contradiction, respondent could only state that the certification of the treasurer is inaccurate because she assumed her position as Assessment Clerk on January 25, 1990 and not on February 1, 1990 as written in the said certification. Respondent, however, failed to explain the gravamen of the inquiry, i.e., that she was certified to be still connected with the Municipal Government of Panabo on June 3, 1991, notwithstanding her assumption of her post in the Regional Trial Court as early as May 16, 1991. To the mind of the Court, respondent's inability to explain this discrepancy is consistent with her failure to satisfactorily explain why she knowingly received and kept a salary she was not entitled to. Worse, it may be indicative of a conscious design to hold two positions at the same time.

Aside from dishonesty, however, respondent is also guilty of failure to perform her legal obligation to disclose her business interests. Respondent herself admitted that she "had a stall in the market." The Office of the Court Administrator also found that she had been receiving rental payments from one Rodolfo Luay for the use of the market stall. That respondent had a stall in the market was undoubtedly a business interest which should have been reported in her Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities. Her failure to do so exposes her to administrative sanction.

Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6713 provides that it is the "obligation" of an employee to submit a sworn statement, as the "public has a right to know" the employee's assets, liabilities, net worth and financial and business interests. Section 11 of the same law prescribes the criminal and administrative penalty for violation of any provision thereof. Paragraph (b) of Section 11 provides that "(b) Any violation hereof proven in a proper administrative proceeding shall be sufficient cause for removal or dismissal of a public official or employee, even if no criminal prosecution is instituted against him."

In the present case, the failure of respondent to disclose her business interest which she herself admitted is inexcusable and is a clear violation of Republic Act No. 6713.

The respondent's claim that her contract of lease of a market stall was never implemented because it became the subject of a civil case, fails to convince us. We agree with the finding of the OCA on respondent's guilt for this separate offense. It is a finding, which further supports its recommendation for respondent's dismissal, to wit: 17
"The case respondent is referring to was filed in 1995. This can be seen from the number of the case which is 95-93. Earlier than the filing of the case, respondent was already collecting rentals — as early as February 22, 1991 — from one Rodolfo Luay who was operating a business without the necessary license.

Respondent should have, therefore, indicated in her 'Sworn Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth, Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial Connections, and Identification of Relatives in the Government Service' for the years 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994 and 1995 that she had a market stall in the Public market of Panabo, Davao.She admits that she never indicated such in her sworn statements.

As this Office had earlier stated in its Memorandum dated November 10, 1995 filed in connection with the instant complaint:
'Such non-disclosure is punishable with imprisonment not exceeding five (5) years, or a fine not exceeding five thousand (P5,000.00) pesos, or both. But even if no criminal prosecution is instituted against the offender, the offender can be dismissed from the service if the violation is proven. Respondent 201 file speaks for itself.
Furthermore, respondent should have divested herself of her interest in said business within sixty (60) days from her assumption into (sic) office. She has not. The penalty for non-disclosure of business interests and non-divestment is the same.'" (Citations omitted.)

In her explanation, respondent maintains the position that she has no business interest, implicitly contending that there is nothing to divulge or divest from. As discussed above, respondent had a business interest. We do not find her administratively liable, however, for failure to divest herself of the said interest. The requirement for public officers, in general, to divest themselves of business interests upon assumption of a public office is prompted by the need to avoid conflict of interests. 18

In the absence of any showing that a business interest will result in a conflict of interest, divestment of the same is unnecessary. In the present case, it seems a bit far-fetched to imagine that there is a conflict of interest because an Interpreter III of the Regional Trial Court has a stall in the market. A court, generally, is not engaged in the regulation of a public market, nor does it concern itself with the activities thereof. While respondent may not be compelled to divest herself of her business interest, she had the legal obligation of divulging it.

WHEREFORE, in conformity with the recommendations of the Office of the Court Administrator, Interpreter III Delsa M. Flores is hereby DISMISSED from service with FORFEITURE of all retirement benefits and accrued leave credits and with PREJUDICE to re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.

SO ORDERED.

Footnotes

  1. Office of the Court Administrator, Informal Preliminary Inquiry.
  2. In Complainant Rabe's separate affidavit, she made the following allegations:
"xxx                    xxx                    xxx
  That on August 14, 1995 at around 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Mrs. Delsa Flores, a Court Interpreter at the Regional Trial Court of Panabo, Davao, went to the stall I occupied and while there, she made several defamatory utterances against me in a very menacing, arrogant and threatening manner and in the Visayan dialect, as follows:
  'Putang ina mo ka, akoa nin pwesto, wala kay ulaw, wala kay batasan, mangingilog ug pwesto'
  That Mrs. Flores attempted to inflict injury upon me by scratching my face but I was able to evade and with the timely intervention of Mr. Espiridion Vivas;
  That Mrs. Flores made the foregoing remarks and other remarks of the same import for several times in a very loud voice while walking to and fro;
  That Mrs. Flores challenged me to a fist fight and destroyed the stall I occupied by removing the wooden fence and the GI sheets with the help of her husband; loaded the materials on a motor vehicle; and brought them to the police station of Panabo;
  That Mrs., Flores committed the aforementioned acts during office hours and in such conduct unbecoming a government employee;
xxx                    xxx                    xxx"
  3. Rollo, p. 2.
  4. Ibid., p. 25.
  5. Ibid., p. 38.
  6 Ibid., p. 39.
  7. Ibid.
  8. Ibid.
  9. Respondent's explanation, p. 2; Rollo, p. 50.
10. Ibid.
11. A.M. No. P-95-1133, April 26, 1996.
12. Section 1, Article XI, 1987 Constitution.
13. Legaspi vs. Garrete, 242 SCRA 679, 701, March 27, 1995 citing Montemayor vs. Collado, Adm. Matter No. 2519-MJ, September 10, 1981, 107 SCRA 258, 264; Association of Court Employees of Panabo, Davao vs. Tupas, Adm. Matter No. RTJ-87-141, July 12, 1989, 175 SCRA 292, 296; Leynes vs. Veloso, Adm. Matter No. 689-MJ and Virrey vs. Veloso,  Adm. Matter No. 809-MJ, the two latter cases promulgated on April 13, 1978, 82 SCRA 352, 328.
14. A.M. No. P-95-115, May 15 1996.
15. Section 27, Article II, 1987 Constitution.
16. Section 23 (a), Rule XIV, Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of EO No. 292 Known as the "Administrative Code of 1987" and other Pertinent Civil Service laws.
17. Pages 6-7 of the Memorandum of the Court Administrator dated November 27, 1996. on this case.
18. Section 9 of RA 6713 provides: "A public official or employee shall avoid conflicts of interest at all times. When a conflict of interest arises, he shall resign from his position in any private business enterprise within thirty (30) days from his assumption of office and or divest himself of his shareholdings or interest within sixty (60) days from such assumption."

Enrile's Speech in the Corona Impeachment

The vote of the Senate President
HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE
On Article II of the Articles of Impeachment against Hon. Chief Justice Renato C. Corona

* * *

In the entire course of this impeachment trial, I have faced many difficult challenges to my own and the Court’s collective wisdom, our sense of justice and fairness, the delicate balancing act we must perform to ensure that we do not stray from the strictures of the Constitution, the law and our rules.

This trial began and unfolded against the backdrop of a highly charged and emotional atmosphere, acrimonious debate in and outside the confines of this Court, and a deep political fissure which threatened the stability of our democratic institutions.

But the impact of the many events that transpired since December 12 last year to this very day, taken altogether, cannot compare to the sense of heaviness that I feel at this very moment.

The culmination of this national drama is at hand, and the time has come for me to render judgment on the person before whom I took my Oath of Office as a Senator of the Republic…no less than the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Renato C. Corona.

The Respondent Chief Justice and his family understandably feel deeply hurt, pained and aggrieved.

As a lawyer, I must confess that I was personally frustrated by the loose and hasty crafting and preparation that characterized the presentation of the charges contained in the Articles of Impeachment. It seemed that the case was being built up only after the charges were actually filed. The repeated recourse to this Court’s compulsory processes to obtain evidence which normally should have formed the factual basis of the charges in the first place further burdened and, at times, taxed the patience of this Court.

We have witnessed with disdain the indiscriminate, deliberate and illegal machinations of some parties who have been less than forthright with this Court in presenting dubiously procured and misleading documents which were spread to the media obviously to influence this Court’s and the public’s opinion.

The letter of the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority which contained, as an attachment, a list of 45 properties supposedly owned by the Respondent Chief Justice, was fed to the media even before we could begin the actual trial of this case.

Even before the Hon. Ombudsman, Conchita Carpio Morales, was called to testify before this Court, her letter to the Chief Justice requiring him to explain in 72 hours an alleged aggregate amount of US$10M in several dollar accounts was leaked to the media right before the resumption of this trial last May 7.

We have sternly cautioned against unethical and unprofessional conduct, the penchant to engage in trial by publicity, to use the media to disseminate and advance so called “information” or “evidence”, to provoke and disrespect this Court and its members, and to irresponsibly hurl disparaging insinuations and accusations.

We have tried to impress upon everyone who may be similarly motivated and inclined to test our will that this Court means serious business and would not succumb to nor allow such underhanded tactics and gimmickry to deter us from our task.

Prudence and justice dictate that in determining the guilt or innocence of the Chief Justice, we must try our best to confine ourselves to the pieces of testimonial and documentary evidence that have been presented to this Court, to pass upon their relevance, and to measure and weigh their value in the light of the charges before us.

After all the accusations levelled against the Chief Justice – eight (8) charges in all comprising the Articles of Impeachment – the Prosecution chose to present evidence only on three Articles (Articles II, III and VII), and abruptly rested its case.

I have always believed that of these three, the case for the Prosecution and the Defense will rise or fall on Article II, which is the subject of this vote.

This Court, at one point, had extensive discussions and differences of opinion, to be sure, regarding the charge contained in Paragraph 2.4 of Article II that the Chief Justice was “suspected and accused of having accumulated ill-gotten wealth, acquiring assets of high values and keeping bank accounts with huge deposits”.

We ruled to disallow the introduction of evidence in support of Par. 2.4 which, to this day, I strongly maintain was an invalid charge, it being based on mere “suspicion”, on so-called “reports”, rather than on factual allegations.

The Defense and the Chief Justice himself somehow revived this issue of the nature of his assets by introducing evidence to prove that his income and assets were legitimate, and by testimony to show how he and his wife had saved and invested these savings in foreign currency over so many decades.

I wish to reiterate, for the record, that the Chief Justice does not stand accused of having amassed any ill-gotten wealth before this Impeachment Court.

Paragraph 2.2 of Article II of the Articles of Impeachment accuses the Respondent Chief Justice of failing to disclose to the public his statement of assets, liabilities and net worth as required by the Constitution.

I submit that the Chief Justice had justifiable and legal grounds to rely on the Supreme Court’s procedural and policy guidelines governing such disclosures as embodied in a Resolution promulgated way back in 1989 when the Respondent was not yet a Member of the Supreme Court.

Under the said guidelines, the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court, who is the repository of the SALN’s submitted by all the Members of the Supreme Court, may furnish copies of the SALN’s in his or her custody to any person upon request, and upon showing that there is a legitimate reason for the same.

The Constitution, in Article XI, Sec. 17, states that “in the case of the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional offices, and offices of the armed forces with general or flag rank, the declaration shall be disclosed to the public in the manner provided by law”.

R.A. 6713, known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, recognizes the public’s right to information on the assets, liabilities, net worth, financial and business interests of public servants. But it likewise declares it unlawful for any person “to obtain or use the same for purposes contrary to morals or public policy or for any commercial purpose other than by news and communications media for dissemination to the general public”.

Whether the said guidelines violate the letter and spirit of R.A. 6713 and the principle of public accountability is not for this Court to pass upon. I grant that the Chief Justice believed in good faith that after periodically filing his sworn Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth, the guidelines issued by the Supreme Court were sufficient to allow the Clerk of Court to comply with the Constitution and the law.

We cannot ignore the fact that the failure or refusal, particularly of public officials in high government positions, to provide the public or the media with copies of the SALN’s, continues to be a raging issue to this day. In fact, some, if not most of the members of the Prosecution panel itself, the Members of the Supreme Court, members of Congress and other high officials of the government have been challenged by media organizations to make their SALN’s available to the public and to the media.

Paragraph 2.3 of Article II further accuses the Respondent Chief Justice, based on “reports”, of not including some properties in his declaration of his assets, liabilities, and net worth, in violation of the anti-graft and corrupt practices act.

The Prosecution, based on the list it procured from the LRA, claims that the Chief Justice owned and failed to fully disclose in his SALN 45 real estate assets. Based on the evidence, I am convinced that the Defense has presented credible evidence to refute this charge and to explain the exclusion in the Respondent Chief Justice’s SALN’s of certain properties which have either been sold or legally transferred, properties which are actually owned by his children and/or third parties, and properties which were never owned by the Respondent in the first place.

I am likewise convinced that the Defense has sufficiently established that there was no ill intention on the part of the Respondent to understate or misrepresent the value of his real properties.

Proceeding now to the most significant charge involving the non-disclosure of the Respondent Chief Justice’s cash assets, the Ombudsman, at the instance of the Defense, testified with a presentation of a report from the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC), showing 82 bank accounts allegedly belonging to the Respondent.

She further testified that based on her analysis of the report, aided by the Commission on Audit, the Chief Justice had cash assets in the examined bank accounts of anywhere from US$10 Million to US$ 12 Million.

Even if we grant the existence of these 82 accounts, the amount of deposits corresponding to each of these could not just easily, fairly or logically be summed up to arrive at exactly how much cash assets or deposits, in actuality and in totality, the Respondent Chief Justice had or has at any given point in time.

Hence, the Ombudsman’s reference to a “transactional balance” of about US$12 Million should not mislead this Court in its appreciation of the facts.

Regrettably, both the Prosecution and the Defense panels decided not to present the concerned bank officers or the AMLC to ascertain the veracity of the data allegedly provided by the AMLC to the Office of the Ombudsman, despite the Respondent’s submission to this Court of a written waiver to cause the opening of all his bank accounts. Laudable as this belated act on the part of the Respondent Chief Justice may be, it would have served him better if he had just presented bank documents as evidence to either confirm or refute the documents showing his bank transactions as presented by the Ombudsman. It has not escaped this Presiding Officer that initially, last May 22nd to be exact, before he walked out of the halls of this Court, the Chief Justice signed the said waiver in open court but made the release of the same conditional, that is, after all the 188 signatories to the Articles of Impeachment and Senator-Judge Franklin Drilon have signed a similar waiver. It was only during the hearing last May 25 that the Chief Justice decided to submit the waiver to the Court without any conditions.

Moreover, even as the Chief Justice had full access to his own bank accounts and all the opportunity to introduce evidence to disprove the data, findings and analysis presented by the Ombudsman or the report of the AMLC, the Defense did not introduce any such evidence.

As it is, the Impeachment Court could only rely on the documents supplied by the Ombudsman which show the Respondent’s bank transactions but which do not show the actual bank balances of Respondent’s bank accounts.

Instead, the Defense presented the Chief Justice himself as its last witness and pleaded for the Court’s permission to allow the Respondent to deliver an “opening statement”.

This Court, out of courtesy to the Chief Justice, decided to extend its understanding and to exercise liberality in granting the request.

The long narration, where the Chief Justice touched on a wide range of issues, assertions of facts, accusations, opinions and personal sentiments, which the Respondent said he found necessary to narrate in order to clear his and his family’s name, was later adopted by the Defense as the direct testimony of the Respondent. The Prosecution, on the other hand, waived its right to cross-examine the Chief Justice, provided the Defense would not conduct any further direct examination.

Nevertheless, the Respondent Chief Justice testified and admitted, in answer to questions from a member of this Court, that he had around P80 Million in 3 Peso accounts and US$2.4 Million in 4 US Dollar accounts, but that he had purposely not declared these assets for 2 reasons: (1) That his Peso accounts represented “co-mingled funds”, and (2) That he was not required to report or declare his foreign currency deposits in his SALN because they were absolutely confidential under R.A. 6426.

I disagree on both counts.

If, indeed, any of the Respondent’s cash deposits were co-mingled with the funds belonging to other parties such as the Basa Guidote Enterprises, Inc. (BGEI) or his children, the Respondent was still duty bound to declare these deposits in his SALN, they being admittedly under his name.

The evidence is devoid of any indication that the Chief Justice was holding these funds in trust for or that they were actually beneficially owned by any one other than himself or his wife.

Assuming that any part of such deposits in truth belonged to third parties, the Respondent could have indicated such third-party funds as corresponding liabilities in his SALN. That would have reflected his real net worth.

With all due respect, I believe that the Respondent Chief Justice’s reliance on the absolute confidentiality accorded to foreign currency deposits under Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426 is grossly misplaced.

The Constitution, in Article XI, Sec. 17, provides that “A public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of office and as often as may be required by law, submit a declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities and net worth. x x x ”

Are we now to say that this Constitutional command is limited to a public official’s assets or deposits in local currency? If so, would we not be saying, in effect, that the Constitution allows something less than a full, honest and complete disclosure?

It bears noting that the prescribed form of the SALN quite simply requires public officers and employees to declare their assets, real and personal, the latter to include cash and bank deposits, bonds, etc. It does not require the public officer or employee to indicate whether or not he or she has foreign currency notes or deposits. Neither does it require details such as account numbers, account names, bank identity nor any branch address. All that it requires is a declaration of the total amount of the funds deposited in any bank account or accounts maintained by the public official or employee concerned.

Surely, the Chief Justice knows the equivalent value in local currency of his foreign currency deposits to be able to declare the same as part of his assets, especially since the aggregate amount of these foreign currency deposits, by his own account, amounts to US$2.4 Million.

The non-disclosure of these deposits, in both local and foreign currency, would naturally result in a corresponding distortion of the Chief Justice’s real net worth.

Consistent with the position taken by this Court in the case filed by the Philippine Savings Bank before the Supreme Court last February, pursuant to which the Supreme Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order, I maintain that the Constitutional principle of public accountability overrides the absolute confidentiality of foreign currency deposits.

The provisions of R.A. 6426 cannot be interpreted as an exception to the unequivocal command and tenor of Article XI, Sec. 17, of the 1987 Constitution, and I regret that the Highest Magistrate of the land, no less, would think otherwise.

Section 8 of R.A. 6426 provides that except with the written permission of the depositor, “in no instance shall foreign currency deposits be examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government official, bureau or office whether judicial or administrative or legislative or any other entity whether public or private.”

The so-called conflict of laws between R.A. Nos. 6713 and 6426 is more illusory than real. Section 8 of R.A. No. 6426 merely prohibits the examination, inquiry or looking into a foreign currency deposit account by an entity or person other than the depositor himself. But there is nothing in R.A. No. 6426 which prohibits the depositor from making a declaration on his own of such foreign currency funds, especially in this case where the Constitution mandates the depositor who is a public officer to declare all assets under oath.

Some have raised the question: Why should the Chief Justice be held accountable for an offense which many, if not most others in Government are guilty of, perhaps even more than he is? They say that hardly anyone declares his true net worth anyway.

Here lies what many have posited as a moral dilemma. I believe it is our duty to resolve this “dilemma” in favor of upholding the law and sound public policy. If we were to agree with the Respondent that he was correct in not disclosing the value of his foreign currency deposits because they are absolutely confidential, can we ever expect any SALN to be filed by public officials from hereon to be more accurate and true than they are today?

I am not oblivious to the possible political repercussions of the final verdict we are called upon to render today. I am deeply concerned that the people may just so easily ignore, forget, if not completely miss out, the hard lessons we all must learn from this episode, instead of grow and mature as citizens of a democratic nation.

Those whose intentions and motivations may be farthest from the lofty ideals of truth and justice are wont to feast upon this man’s downfall should this Court render a guilty verdict.

I am equally aware of the tremendous pressure weighing heavily upon all the members of this Court as we had to come to a decision on this case, one way or the other.

But to render a just verdict according to my best lights and my own conscience is a sacred duty that I have sworn to perform.

As one who has been through many personal upheavals through all of my 88 years, I, too, have been judged, often unfairly and harshly. But I have constantly held that those who face the judgment of imperfect and fallible mortals like us have recourse to the judgment of history, and, ultimately, of God.

And so, with full trust that the Almighty will see us through the aftermath of this chapter in our nation’s history, I vote to hold the Chief Justice, Renato C. Corona, GUILTY as charged under Article II, Par. 2.3, and that his deliberate act of excluding substantial assets from his sworn Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth constitutes a culpable violation of the Constitution.

my 2010 photo with former chief justice R.Puno with the sticker "NO TO MIDNIGHT CHIEF JUSTICE"

 (After 43 trial days and hundreds of grueling hours of hearing, the Senate sitting as impeachment court have declared Chief Justice Renato Corona guilty May 29, 2012. 

Joan of Arc and Gabriela Silang, women freedom fighters

Dateline : April 18,1909  – Joan of Arc was beatified in Rome. . The 19-year-old Joan of Arc was burned at the stake   in Rouen, France on May 30, 1431  by an English-dominated tribunal. She was canonized in  1920. May 30   is her feast day.

Joan of Arc, nicknamed "The Maid of Orléans" (French: Jeanne d'Arc)  is a national heroine of France and a Roman Catholic saint. A peasant girl born in what is now eastern France, who claimed divine guidance, she led the French army to several important victories during the Hundred Years' War, which paved the way for the coronation of Charles VII. She was captured by the Burgundians, transferred to the English in exchange for money, put on trial by the pro-English Bishop of Beauvais Pierre Cauchon for charges of "insubordination and heterodoxy,"and burned at the stake as a heretic when she was only 19 years old. Twenty-five years after the execution, an Inquisitorial court authorized by Pope Callixtus III examined the trial, pronounced her innocent and declared her a martyr. Joan of Arc was beatified in 1909 and canonized in 1920.

In the Philippines, more than being the wife of revolutionary Diego Silang, Gabriela Silang is regarded as the country’s “Joan of Arc” and the first Filipina general who fought Spanish invaders in the 18th century. As the wife of the famous Diego Silang, Ilocandia’s liberator, Maria Josefa Gabriela was popularly known as Mrs. Diego Silang. By her own right, she was equally great as her husband. After her husband’s assassination, she continued his libertarian movement, fighting valiantly on the bloody battlefields and died with heroic courage at the hands of the Spanish enemy.

On September 10, 1873, the fierce battle between Gabriela's troops and the Spanish occured in Vigan. They faced a larger army of the enemy with the help of Tagalogs, Kapampangans and some Ilocano conspirators. Many was killed on her side. She escaped along with her Uncle Nicolas and seven remaining members. They were later caught in Santa on September 29, 1763. They were summarily hanged in the plaza of Vigan with Gabriela being the last to die.

While most would consider Diego and Gabriela Silang’s effort as a futile attempt to rid of Spanish rule, it should be noted that they already imagined freeing the Philippines from colonial rule some 130 years before the Gomburza, Jose Rizal or Andres Bonifacio. This is the reason that the husband and wife were sometimes referred to as the precursors of Filipino nationalism as they fought for the same ideals penned by Rizal and which Bonifacio took into armed revolution,

More than anything else, Gabriela and Joan's contribution to history shows “that women are indispensable partners of in the great task of nation building,”

Is the Philipines ready for Divorce?

Dateline: May 29, 2011 - The divorce referendum was held in Malta  to consult the electorate on the introduction of divorce, and resulted in a majority of the voters approving legalisation of divorce. At that time, Malta was one of only three countries in the world, along with the Philippines and the Vatican City,in which divorce was not permitted.. As a consequence of the referendum outcome, a law allowing divorce under certain conditions was enacted in the same year. As Philippines and Vatican are the remaining two countries where no divorce is allowed, are Filipinos  ready to accept it  now? Philippine law, in general, does not provide for divorce inside the Philippines. The only exception is with respect to Muslims, who are allowed to divorce in certain circumstances. The Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines allows for divorce—however, with stipulations: namely, a man can divorce his wife, but a woman cannot divorce her husband. For those not of the Muslim faith, the law only allows annulment of marriages. Article 26 of the Family Code of the Philippines does provide that Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. This would seem to apply only if the spouse obtaining the foreign divorce is an alien. According to a Social Weather Station survey conducted in March 2011, “50 percent of adult Filipinos agree and 33 percent disagree with the statement: 'Married couples who have already separated and cannot reconcile anymore should be allowed to divorce so that they can get legally married again.’” In 2005, a similar survey was conducted which showed that 43 percent of adult Filipinos were in favor of divorce and 44 percent were not. According to the Proposed divorce bill , House Bill 1799 ,  in Congress sponsored by the  Gabriela Partylist, the sanctity of marriage is not based on the number of marriages existing but on the quality of marital relationships. When a marriage is no longer viable, divorce should be an option. Underpinning this proposal is a commitment to the policy of the State to protect and strengthen marriage and the family as basic social institutions, to value the dignity of every human person, to guarantee full respect for human rights, and to ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men. Even when couples start out well in their marriage, political, economic and social realities take their toll on their relationship. Some are not prepared to handle the intricacies of the married life. For a large number of women, the inequalities and violence in marriage negate its ideals as the embodiment of love, care and safety and erode the bases upon which a marriage is founded. The marital relations facilitate the commission of violence and perpetuate their oppression. Given these realities, the bill stressed, couples must have the option to avail of remedies that will pave the way for the attainment of their full human development and selffulfillment and the protection of their human rights. The following are the grounds under the proposed bill:  (1) THE PETITIONER HAS BEEN SEPARATED DE FACTO FROM HIS OR HER SPOUSE FOR AT LEAST FIVE YEARS AT THE TIME OF THE FILING OF THE PETITION AND RECONCILIATION IS HIGHLY IMPROBABLE; (2) THE PETITIONER HAS BEEN LEGALLY SEPARATED FROM HIS OR HER SPOUSE FOR AT LEAST TWO YEARS AT THE TIME OF THE FILING OF THE PETITION AND RECONCILIATION IS HIGHLY IMPROBABLE; (3) WHEN ANY OF THE GROUNDS FOR LEGAL SEPARATION UNDER PARAGRAPH (A) OF THIS ARTICLE HAS CAUSED THE IRREPARABLE BREAKDOWN OF THE MARRIAGE; (4) WHEN ONE OR BOTH SPOUSES ARE PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATIONS; (5) WHEN THE SPOUSES SUFFER FROM IRRECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES THAT HAVE CAUSED THE IRREPARABLE BREAKDOWN OF THE MARRIAGE.” Annulment of Marriage Under the present legal regime, the process  for a marriage solemnized in the Philippines to be terminated is called an annulment.  An annulment unlike a divorce has the effect of considering the marriage as “void ab initio”, a latin term to meaning the marriage NEVER existed at all.  The grounds for annulment are often pertaining to the absence of, or defect in, one of the essential or formal requisites of marriage. Although it has a different effect in how it considers the marriage (null and void) after annulment, it has however the same effect in terms of capacitating the parties to remarry. It should be noted that for a marriage to take place, there are essential requisites and formal requisites which must first be met. The essential requisites of marriage are: 1) legal capacity of the contracting party, who must be male and female, and 2) consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer (Article 2, Family Code [FC]).  The formal requisites of marriage are (1) authority of the solemnizing officer, (2) a valid marriage license (except in specific instances mentioned under Chapter 2 of the Family Code), and (3) a marriage ceremony which takes place with both of the contracting parties appearing before the solemnizing officer and declaring that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age. (Article 3, FC). In an Action for Annulment of Marriage, the following marriages may be annulled: that the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen years of age or over, but below twenty-one, and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of the parents, guardian or person having substitute parental authority over the party, in that order, unless after attaining the age of twenty-one, such party freely cohabited with the other and both lived together as husband and wife; that either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife; that the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife; that the consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence, unless the same having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife; that either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other, and such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; or that either party was afflicted with a sexually-transmissible disease found to be serious and appears to be incurable.  Unlike in the first set of grounds above mentioned, an action for the annulment of marriage prescribes; in case of lack of consent, until the party filing for annulment reaches 21;  in case of insanity until the death of either party or the lucid interval of the insane spouse; in case of fraud, force, intimidation or undue influence, incapacity to consummate the marriage or knowledge of the sexually-transmissible disease, within five years from the occurrence of the fraud, force, intimidation or undue influence, incapacity to consummate the marriage or knowledge of the sexually-transmissible disease.   Although many loosely call all actions for terminating marriage in the Philippines as annulment, the truth is there are other  actions that may be instituted to terminate the marriage. Declaration of Nullity of Marriage Grounds rendering a marriage “void ab initio” are: those contracted by any party below 18 even with the consent of parents or guardians; those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriage unless either or both parties believed in good faith that the solemnizing officer had the legal authority to do so; those solemnized without a marriage license except those expresslyexempted by law to secure a marriage license; those bigamous or polygamous marriages; those contracted through mistake of one of the contracting parties as to the identity of the other; incestuous marriages as defined in Article 37 of the FC; and void marriages by reason of public policy (i.e. between step-parents and step-children, between adopting parent and adopted child). An action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of marriage may be instituted at any time and shall not prescribe (Art. 39, FC). It must be emphasized that although the marriage is void from the beginning, a party cannot unilaterally contract a subsequent marriage with the thought in mind that the previous marriage was invalid.  For example, A and B contracted a marriage with a fake marriage license.  Spouse B who knew that the marriage license was fake contracted a second marriage with C.  Is the marriage between Spouse B and C valid? No!  The marriage between A and B should have first been declared null and void by the Court before Spouse B and C can marry. . In the event that annulment is not feasible, the Family Code Art. 55 (A) states that a petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds: (1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner; (2) Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious or political affiliation; (3) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or inducement; (4) Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six years, even if pardoned; (5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent; (6) Lesbianism or homosexuality-of the respondent; (7) Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in the Philippines or abroad;, (8) Sexual infidelity or perversion; (9) Attempt by the respondent against life of the petitioner; or (10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one year.