Narita Rabe vs. Delsa Flores

(Most of the Senator judges cited the case of the court interpreter Delsa Flores who  was dismissed from service in an en banc decision by the Supreme Court dated May 14, 1997with her retirement benefits and leave credits forfeited and was also blocked from being employed by any government agency and corporation. But it was not just about the statement of assets, liabilities, and net worth (SALN) that Flores violated. She was dismissed for dishonesty, for still collecting from the Municipal Government when she was already employed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 4. Here is the full text of the decision).

EN BANC
[A.M. No. P-97-1247.  May 14, 1997.]
(Formerly A.M. OCA I.P.I. 1 No. 95-71-P)
NARITA RABE, complainant, vs. DELSA M. FLORES, Interpreter III, RTC, Branch IV, Panabo, Davao, respondent.
Edgar D. Rabor for complainant.

SYLLABUS
1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; PUBLIC EMPLOYEES; MISCONDUCT; STEALING; CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED BY DIRE FINANCIAL NEED AND FORGETFULNESS. — Respondent's overriding need for money from the municipal government, aggravated by the alleged delay in the processing of her initial salary from the Court, does not justify receipt of a salary not due her. If poverty and pressing financial need could justify stealing, the government would have been bankrupt long ago. A public servant should never expect to become wealthy in government. And if respondent was just driven by dire pecuniary need, respondent should have returned the salary she had obtained from the Municipal Government of Panabo as soon as she obtained her salary from the court. However, she returned the money only after receipt of the Court's Resolution saying that she forgot all about it. Forgetfulness or failure to remember is never a rational or acceptable explanation.

2. ID.; ID.; COURT PERSONNEL; PROPER DECORUM; VIOLATED IN CASE AT BAR. — It is well to stress once again the constitutional declaration that a "(p)ublic office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives." We have repeatedly held that although every office in the government service is a public trust, no position exacts a greater demand for moral righteousness and uprightness from an individual than in the judiciary. Personnel in the judiciary should conduct themselves in such a manner as to be beyond reproach and suspicion, and free from any appearance of impropriety in their personal behavior, not only in the discharge of their official duties but also in their everyday life. They are strictly mandated to maintain good moral character at all times and to observe irreproachable behavior so as not to outrage public decency. Respondent's malfeasance is a clear contravention of the constitutional dictum that the State shall "maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and effective measures against graft and corruption."

3. ID.; ID.; DISHONESTY; PROPER PENALTY IS DISMISSAL. — Under the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of EO No. 292 known as the "Administrative Code of 1987" and other pertinent Civil Service Laws, the penalty for dishonesty is dismissal, even for the first offense. For respondent's dishonesty in receiving and keeping what she was not lawfully entitled to, this Court has the duty to impose on her the penalty prescribed by law; dismissal.

4. ID.; ID.; REPUBLIC ACT 6713; OBLIGATION TO DISCLOSE BUSINESS INTEREST; CASE AT BAR. — Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6713 provides that it is the "obligation"' of an employee to submit a sworn statement, as the "public has a right to know" the employee's assets, liabilities, net worth and financial and business interests. Section 11 of the same law prescribes the criminal and administrative penalty for violation of any provision thereof. Paragraph (b) of Section 11 provides that "(b) Any violation hereof proven in a proper administrative proceeding shall be sufficient cause for removal or dismissal of a public official or employee, even if no criminal prosecution is instituted against him." In the present case, the failure of respondent to disclose her business interest which she herself admitted is inexcusable and is a clear violation of Republic Act No. 6713. We do not find her administratively liable, however, for failure to divest herself of the said interest. The requirement for public officers, in general, to divest themselves of business interests upon assumption of a public office is prompted by the need to avoid conflict of interests. In the absence of any showing that a business interest will result in a conflict of interest, divestment of the same is unnecessary. In the present case, it seems a bit far-fetched to imagine that there is a conflict of interest because an Interpreter III of the Regional Trial Court has a stall in the market. A court, generally, is not engaged in the regulation of a public market, nor does it concern itself with the activities thereof. While respondent may not be compelled to divest herself of her business interest, she had the legal obligation of divulging it.

D E C I S I O N
Narvasa, C .J ., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban, and Torres, Jr., JJ ., concur.

PER CURIAM p:

In an administrative complaint for "Conduct Unbecoming a Government Employee, Acts Prejudicial to the Interest of the Service and Abuse of Authority" dated August 18, 1995, Complainant Narita Rabe, 2 by counsel, charged Respondent Delsa M. Flores, Interpreter III at the Regional Trial Court, Branch IV, Panabo, Davao, as follows: 3
"(Mrs.) Flores took advantage of her position as a court employee by claiming a stall at the extension of the Public Public (sic) Market when she is (sic) not a member of our client's association and was never a party to Civil Case No. 89-23. She herself knows (sic) that the stalls in the said area had already been awarded to our client's members pursuant to the decision of the court on October 30, 1991. Worse, she took the law into her hands when she destroyed the stall of our client and brought the materials to the police station of Panabo, Davao."

After respondent filed her answer, the Court issued a Resolution dated January 17, 1996, absolving her of the charge. In the same resolution, however, the Court required respondent to explain why she should not be administratively dealt with for the following: 4
". . . a) why she obtained a certification dated June 18, 1991 issued by Atty. Victor R. Ginete, Clerk of Court, same court, that she started performing her duties as (an) interpreter on May 16, 1991 when (1) according to a certification dated June 17, 1991 issued by Mr. Jose B. Avenido, Municipal Treasurer, Panabo Davao, she was employed in the office of the Municipal Assessor as Assessment Clerk I since February 1, 1990 to June 3, 1991 with her last salary being paid by said office on June 3, 1991; and (2) she took her oath of office before Judge Mariano C. Tupas only on June 17, 1991;
b) why she did not report said business interest in her sworn statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth, Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial Connections, and Identification of Relatives in the Government Service for the years 1991, 1992, 1993, and 1994;
c) why she has not divested herself of her interest in said business within sixty (60) days from her assumption into (sic) office; and
d) why she has indicated in her DTRs for August 1995 that she worked on August 15-18, 21, 23-25 and 28-31 and for September, 1995 that she worked for all its twenty one (21) working days when her Contract of Lease with the Municipal Government of Panabo for the market stall in its Section 7 clearly states that she has to personally conduct her business and be present at the stall otherwise the same would be canceled as per its Section 13."

Respondent Flores, in a letter dated February 13, 1996, explains that, as stated in the certification of Atty. Ginete, she assumed her job in the Regional Trial Court, Branch IV, Panabo, Davao on May 16, 1991, in compliance with the directive from this Court for her to start working on the said date. Respondent further states that "even prior to said date (May 16, 1991)" she already reported to the court in order to familiarize herself with the scope of her duties. 5

Respondent Flores also admits that she had received from the municipality a salary for the period May 16 1991 — May 31, 1991, notwithstanding her transfer to the judiciary on May 16, 1991. She submits, however, the following justification: 6

"I admit that I received my last salary in the amount of One Thousand and 80/100 (P1,000.80) Pesos from the Local Government Unit from May 16-31, 1991 but farthest from my mind is the intent to defraud the government. It was my desire all the time to refund the amount the moment my salary is received from the Supreme Court, unfortunately more often than not (the salary) is received three or four months after assumption of office. As we all know the month of May and June is the time we enroll our children in school thus the money I got that month from the Local Government Unit came handy in defraying registration expenses of my four children. The passage of time coupled with some intervening events, made me oblivious of my obligation to refund the money. However, when my attention was called on the day I received the copy of the resolution, I took no time in refunding the same."

Respondent alleges that the certification of Municipal Treasurer Jose V. Avenido is inaccurate because it was on January 25, 1990 that she was appointed as Assessment Clerk I. 7 According to respondent, she took her oath on June 17, 1991, simply because it was on that date that she received a copy of her oath form. 8

Respondent avers that she did not divulge any business interest in her Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Financial Disclosure for the years 1991-1994 because she "was never engaged in business during said period although I had a stall in the market." 9

Respondent further avers that her Daily Time Record indicated that she held office on August 15, 18, 21, 23 to 25 and 28, 31 and all the working days of September, 1995 "because in truth and in fact . . . (she) did hold office on those days." This was because her contract of lease with the Municipal Government of Panabo was never implemented as it became the subject of "Civil Case No. 95-53 — Panabo Public Market Vendors Assn. Inc. and Pag-ibig Ng Gulayan Ass. Inc. vs. Municipality of Panabo, et al., for Declaration of Nullity of Mun. Ord. No. XLV, Series of 1994." 10

The Court referred the matter to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation. In its report, the OCA found respondent guilty of dishonesty and failure to report her business interest, and recommended that the penalty of dismissal be imposed on her. The Court finds that the report and recommendation of the OCA is in accord with the evidence and the law. We hold the explanation of respondent unsatisfactory. Respondent's misconduct is evident from the records.

By her own admission, respondent had collected her salary from the Municipality of Panabo for the period of May 16-31, 1991, when she was already working at the RTC. She knew that she was no longer entitled to a salary from the municipal government, but she took it just the same. She returned the amount only upon receipt of the Court Resolution dated January 17, 1996, or more than five (5) years later. We cannot countenance the same. Respondent's conduct is plain dishonesty.

Her explanation, as observed earlier, is unsatisfactory. Her overriding need for money from the municipal government, aggravated by the alleged delay in the processing of her initial salary from the Court, does not justify receipt of a salary not due her. We sympathize with respondent's sad plight of being the sole breadwinner of her family, with her husband and parents to feed and children to send to school. This, however, is not an acceptable excuse for her misconduct. If poverty and pressing financial need could justify stealing, the government would have been bankrupt long ago. A public servant should never expect to become wealthy in government.

But there is really more to respondents' defense of poverty. If respondent was just driven by dire pecuniary need, respondent should have returned the salary she had obtained from the Municipal Government of Panabo as soon as she obtained her salary from the court. However, she returned the money only after receipt of the Court's Resolution dated January 17, 1996, saying that she forgot all about it. Forgetfulness or failure to remember is never a rational or acceptable explanation.

In Macario Flores vs. Nonilon Caniya, Deputy Sheriff, RTC, Imus, Cavite, 11 this Court ruled that a sheriff who failed to issue an official receipt for the money entrusted to him for the purpose of satisfying a judgment debt, "had really wanted to misappropriate the said amount." Inevitably, he was dismissed from service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and accrued leave credits, with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.

It is well to stress once again the constitutional declaration that a "(p)ublic office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives." 12

We have repeatedly held that although every office in the government service is a public trust, no position exacts a greater demand for moral righteousness and uprightness from an individual than in the judiciary. Personnel in the judiciary should conduct themselves in such a manner as to be beyond reproach and suspicion, and free from any appearance of impropriety in their personal behavior, not only in the discharge of their official duties but also in their everyday life. They are strictly mandated to maintain good moral character at all times and to observe irreproachable behavior so as not to outrage public decency. 13

This Court, in JPDIO vs. Josephine Calaguas, Records Officer, OCC, MTCC, Angeles City, 14 held:
"The Court must reiterate that a public office is a public trust. A public servant is expected to exhibit, at all times, the highest degree of honesty and integrity and should be made accountable to all those who he serves."

Respondent's malfeasance is a clear contravention of the constitutional dictum that the State shall "maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and effective measures against graft and corruption." 15

Under the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of EO No. 292 known as the "Administrative Code of 1987" and other pertinent Civil Service Laws, the penalty for dishonesty is dismissal, even for the first offense. 16 Accordingly, for respondent's dishonesty in receiving and keeping what she was not lawfully entitled to, this Court has the duty to impose on her the penalty prescribed by law: dismissal.

Apart from the above finding, we also note the contradiction between the certification issued by Municipal Treasurer Jose Avenido stating that respondent had worked as an assessment clerk in his office up to June 3, 1991, and the certification of Clerk of Court Victor Ginete stating that respondent started working as an interpreter on May 16, 1991. Although specifically asked by the Court to explain this contradiction, respondent could only state that the certification of the treasurer is inaccurate because she assumed her position as Assessment Clerk on January 25, 1990 and not on February 1, 1990 as written in the said certification. Respondent, however, failed to explain the gravamen of the inquiry, i.e., that she was certified to be still connected with the Municipal Government of Panabo on June 3, 1991, notwithstanding her assumption of her post in the Regional Trial Court as early as May 16, 1991. To the mind of the Court, respondent's inability to explain this discrepancy is consistent with her failure to satisfactorily explain why she knowingly received and kept a salary she was not entitled to. Worse, it may be indicative of a conscious design to hold two positions at the same time.

Aside from dishonesty, however, respondent is also guilty of failure to perform her legal obligation to disclose her business interests. Respondent herself admitted that she "had a stall in the market." The Office of the Court Administrator also found that she had been receiving rental payments from one Rodolfo Luay for the use of the market stall. That respondent had a stall in the market was undoubtedly a business interest which should have been reported in her Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities. Her failure to do so exposes her to administrative sanction.

Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6713 provides that it is the "obligation" of an employee to submit a sworn statement, as the "public has a right to know" the employee's assets, liabilities, net worth and financial and business interests. Section 11 of the same law prescribes the criminal and administrative penalty for violation of any provision thereof. Paragraph (b) of Section 11 provides that "(b) Any violation hereof proven in a proper administrative proceeding shall be sufficient cause for removal or dismissal of a public official or employee, even if no criminal prosecution is instituted against him."

In the present case, the failure of respondent to disclose her business interest which she herself admitted is inexcusable and is a clear violation of Republic Act No. 6713.

The respondent's claim that her contract of lease of a market stall was never implemented because it became the subject of a civil case, fails to convince us. We agree with the finding of the OCA on respondent's guilt for this separate offense. It is a finding, which further supports its recommendation for respondent's dismissal, to wit: 17
"The case respondent is referring to was filed in 1995. This can be seen from the number of the case which is 95-93. Earlier than the filing of the case, respondent was already collecting rentals — as early as February 22, 1991 — from one Rodolfo Luay who was operating a business without the necessary license.

Respondent should have, therefore, indicated in her 'Sworn Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth, Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial Connections, and Identification of Relatives in the Government Service' for the years 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994 and 1995 that she had a market stall in the Public market of Panabo, Davao.She admits that she never indicated such in her sworn statements.

As this Office had earlier stated in its Memorandum dated November 10, 1995 filed in connection with the instant complaint:
'Such non-disclosure is punishable with imprisonment not exceeding five (5) years, or a fine not exceeding five thousand (P5,000.00) pesos, or both. But even if no criminal prosecution is instituted against the offender, the offender can be dismissed from the service if the violation is proven. Respondent 201 file speaks for itself.
Furthermore, respondent should have divested herself of her interest in said business within sixty (60) days from her assumption into (sic) office. She has not. The penalty for non-disclosure of business interests and non-divestment is the same.'" (Citations omitted.)

In her explanation, respondent maintains the position that she has no business interest, implicitly contending that there is nothing to divulge or divest from. As discussed above, respondent had a business interest. We do not find her administratively liable, however, for failure to divest herself of the said interest. The requirement for public officers, in general, to divest themselves of business interests upon assumption of a public office is prompted by the need to avoid conflict of interests. 18

In the absence of any showing that a business interest will result in a conflict of interest, divestment of the same is unnecessary. In the present case, it seems a bit far-fetched to imagine that there is a conflict of interest because an Interpreter III of the Regional Trial Court has a stall in the market. A court, generally, is not engaged in the regulation of a public market, nor does it concern itself with the activities thereof. While respondent may not be compelled to divest herself of her business interest, she had the legal obligation of divulging it.

WHEREFORE, in conformity with the recommendations of the Office of the Court Administrator, Interpreter III Delsa M. Flores is hereby DISMISSED from service with FORFEITURE of all retirement benefits and accrued leave credits and with PREJUDICE to re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.

SO ORDERED.

Footnotes

  1. Office of the Court Administrator, Informal Preliminary Inquiry.
  2. In Complainant Rabe's separate affidavit, she made the following allegations:
"xxx                    xxx                    xxx
  That on August 14, 1995 at around 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Mrs. Delsa Flores, a Court Interpreter at the Regional Trial Court of Panabo, Davao, went to the stall I occupied and while there, she made several defamatory utterances against me in a very menacing, arrogant and threatening manner and in the Visayan dialect, as follows:
  'Putang ina mo ka, akoa nin pwesto, wala kay ulaw, wala kay batasan, mangingilog ug pwesto'
  That Mrs. Flores attempted to inflict injury upon me by scratching my face but I was able to evade and with the timely intervention of Mr. Espiridion Vivas;
  That Mrs. Flores made the foregoing remarks and other remarks of the same import for several times in a very loud voice while walking to and fro;
  That Mrs. Flores challenged me to a fist fight and destroyed the stall I occupied by removing the wooden fence and the GI sheets with the help of her husband; loaded the materials on a motor vehicle; and brought them to the police station of Panabo;
  That Mrs., Flores committed the aforementioned acts during office hours and in such conduct unbecoming a government employee;
xxx                    xxx                    xxx"
  3. Rollo, p. 2.
  4. Ibid., p. 25.
  5. Ibid., p. 38.
  6 Ibid., p. 39.
  7. Ibid.
  8. Ibid.
  9. Respondent's explanation, p. 2; Rollo, p. 50.
10. Ibid.
11. A.M. No. P-95-1133, April 26, 1996.
12. Section 1, Article XI, 1987 Constitution.
13. Legaspi vs. Garrete, 242 SCRA 679, 701, March 27, 1995 citing Montemayor vs. Collado, Adm. Matter No. 2519-MJ, September 10, 1981, 107 SCRA 258, 264; Association of Court Employees of Panabo, Davao vs. Tupas, Adm. Matter No. RTJ-87-141, July 12, 1989, 175 SCRA 292, 296; Leynes vs. Veloso, Adm. Matter No. 689-MJ and Virrey vs. Veloso,  Adm. Matter No. 809-MJ, the two latter cases promulgated on April 13, 1978, 82 SCRA 352, 328.
14. A.M. No. P-95-115, May 15 1996.
15. Section 27, Article II, 1987 Constitution.
16. Section 23 (a), Rule XIV, Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of EO No. 292 Known as the "Administrative Code of 1987" and other Pertinent Civil Service laws.
17. Pages 6-7 of the Memorandum of the Court Administrator dated November 27, 1996. on this case.
18. Section 9 of RA 6713 provides: "A public official or employee shall avoid conflicts of interest at all times. When a conflict of interest arises, he shall resign from his position in any private business enterprise within thirty (30) days from his assumption of office and or divest himself of his shareholdings or interest within sixty (60) days from such assumption."

Enrile's Speech in the Corona Impeachment

The vote of the Senate President
HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE
On Article II of the Articles of Impeachment against Hon. Chief Justice Renato C. Corona

* * *

In the entire course of this impeachment trial, I have faced many difficult challenges to my own and the Court’s collective wisdom, our sense of justice and fairness, the delicate balancing act we must perform to ensure that we do not stray from the strictures of the Constitution, the law and our rules.

This trial began and unfolded against the backdrop of a highly charged and emotional atmosphere, acrimonious debate in and outside the confines of this Court, and a deep political fissure which threatened the stability of our democratic institutions.

But the impact of the many events that transpired since December 12 last year to this very day, taken altogether, cannot compare to the sense of heaviness that I feel at this very moment.

The culmination of this national drama is at hand, and the time has come for me to render judgment on the person before whom I took my Oath of Office as a Senator of the Republic…no less than the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Renato C. Corona.

The Respondent Chief Justice and his family understandably feel deeply hurt, pained and aggrieved.

As a lawyer, I must confess that I was personally frustrated by the loose and hasty crafting and preparation that characterized the presentation of the charges contained in the Articles of Impeachment. It seemed that the case was being built up only after the charges were actually filed. The repeated recourse to this Court’s compulsory processes to obtain evidence which normally should have formed the factual basis of the charges in the first place further burdened and, at times, taxed the patience of this Court.

We have witnessed with disdain the indiscriminate, deliberate and illegal machinations of some parties who have been less than forthright with this Court in presenting dubiously procured and misleading documents which were spread to the media obviously to influence this Court’s and the public’s opinion.

The letter of the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority which contained, as an attachment, a list of 45 properties supposedly owned by the Respondent Chief Justice, was fed to the media even before we could begin the actual trial of this case.

Even before the Hon. Ombudsman, Conchita Carpio Morales, was called to testify before this Court, her letter to the Chief Justice requiring him to explain in 72 hours an alleged aggregate amount of US$10M in several dollar accounts was leaked to the media right before the resumption of this trial last May 7.

We have sternly cautioned against unethical and unprofessional conduct, the penchant to engage in trial by publicity, to use the media to disseminate and advance so called “information” or “evidence”, to provoke and disrespect this Court and its members, and to irresponsibly hurl disparaging insinuations and accusations.

We have tried to impress upon everyone who may be similarly motivated and inclined to test our will that this Court means serious business and would not succumb to nor allow such underhanded tactics and gimmickry to deter us from our task.

Prudence and justice dictate that in determining the guilt or innocence of the Chief Justice, we must try our best to confine ourselves to the pieces of testimonial and documentary evidence that have been presented to this Court, to pass upon their relevance, and to measure and weigh their value in the light of the charges before us.

After all the accusations levelled against the Chief Justice – eight (8) charges in all comprising the Articles of Impeachment – the Prosecution chose to present evidence only on three Articles (Articles II, III and VII), and abruptly rested its case.

I have always believed that of these three, the case for the Prosecution and the Defense will rise or fall on Article II, which is the subject of this vote.

This Court, at one point, had extensive discussions and differences of opinion, to be sure, regarding the charge contained in Paragraph 2.4 of Article II that the Chief Justice was “suspected and accused of having accumulated ill-gotten wealth, acquiring assets of high values and keeping bank accounts with huge deposits”.

We ruled to disallow the introduction of evidence in support of Par. 2.4 which, to this day, I strongly maintain was an invalid charge, it being based on mere “suspicion”, on so-called “reports”, rather than on factual allegations.

The Defense and the Chief Justice himself somehow revived this issue of the nature of his assets by introducing evidence to prove that his income and assets were legitimate, and by testimony to show how he and his wife had saved and invested these savings in foreign currency over so many decades.

I wish to reiterate, for the record, that the Chief Justice does not stand accused of having amassed any ill-gotten wealth before this Impeachment Court.

Paragraph 2.2 of Article II of the Articles of Impeachment accuses the Respondent Chief Justice of failing to disclose to the public his statement of assets, liabilities and net worth as required by the Constitution.

I submit that the Chief Justice had justifiable and legal grounds to rely on the Supreme Court’s procedural and policy guidelines governing such disclosures as embodied in a Resolution promulgated way back in 1989 when the Respondent was not yet a Member of the Supreme Court.

Under the said guidelines, the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court, who is the repository of the SALN’s submitted by all the Members of the Supreme Court, may furnish copies of the SALN’s in his or her custody to any person upon request, and upon showing that there is a legitimate reason for the same.

The Constitution, in Article XI, Sec. 17, states that “in the case of the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional offices, and offices of the armed forces with general or flag rank, the declaration shall be disclosed to the public in the manner provided by law”.

R.A. 6713, known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, recognizes the public’s right to information on the assets, liabilities, net worth, financial and business interests of public servants. But it likewise declares it unlawful for any person “to obtain or use the same for purposes contrary to morals or public policy or for any commercial purpose other than by news and communications media for dissemination to the general public”.

Whether the said guidelines violate the letter and spirit of R.A. 6713 and the principle of public accountability is not for this Court to pass upon. I grant that the Chief Justice believed in good faith that after periodically filing his sworn Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth, the guidelines issued by the Supreme Court were sufficient to allow the Clerk of Court to comply with the Constitution and the law.

We cannot ignore the fact that the failure or refusal, particularly of public officials in high government positions, to provide the public or the media with copies of the SALN’s, continues to be a raging issue to this day. In fact, some, if not most of the members of the Prosecution panel itself, the Members of the Supreme Court, members of Congress and other high officials of the government have been challenged by media organizations to make their SALN’s available to the public and to the media.

Paragraph 2.3 of Article II further accuses the Respondent Chief Justice, based on “reports”, of not including some properties in his declaration of his assets, liabilities, and net worth, in violation of the anti-graft and corrupt practices act.

The Prosecution, based on the list it procured from the LRA, claims that the Chief Justice owned and failed to fully disclose in his SALN 45 real estate assets. Based on the evidence, I am convinced that the Defense has presented credible evidence to refute this charge and to explain the exclusion in the Respondent Chief Justice’s SALN’s of certain properties which have either been sold or legally transferred, properties which are actually owned by his children and/or third parties, and properties which were never owned by the Respondent in the first place.

I am likewise convinced that the Defense has sufficiently established that there was no ill intention on the part of the Respondent to understate or misrepresent the value of his real properties.

Proceeding now to the most significant charge involving the non-disclosure of the Respondent Chief Justice’s cash assets, the Ombudsman, at the instance of the Defense, testified with a presentation of a report from the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC), showing 82 bank accounts allegedly belonging to the Respondent.

She further testified that based on her analysis of the report, aided by the Commission on Audit, the Chief Justice had cash assets in the examined bank accounts of anywhere from US$10 Million to US$ 12 Million.

Even if we grant the existence of these 82 accounts, the amount of deposits corresponding to each of these could not just easily, fairly or logically be summed up to arrive at exactly how much cash assets or deposits, in actuality and in totality, the Respondent Chief Justice had or has at any given point in time.

Hence, the Ombudsman’s reference to a “transactional balance” of about US$12 Million should not mislead this Court in its appreciation of the facts.

Regrettably, both the Prosecution and the Defense panels decided not to present the concerned bank officers or the AMLC to ascertain the veracity of the data allegedly provided by the AMLC to the Office of the Ombudsman, despite the Respondent’s submission to this Court of a written waiver to cause the opening of all his bank accounts. Laudable as this belated act on the part of the Respondent Chief Justice may be, it would have served him better if he had just presented bank documents as evidence to either confirm or refute the documents showing his bank transactions as presented by the Ombudsman. It has not escaped this Presiding Officer that initially, last May 22nd to be exact, before he walked out of the halls of this Court, the Chief Justice signed the said waiver in open court but made the release of the same conditional, that is, after all the 188 signatories to the Articles of Impeachment and Senator-Judge Franklin Drilon have signed a similar waiver. It was only during the hearing last May 25 that the Chief Justice decided to submit the waiver to the Court without any conditions.

Moreover, even as the Chief Justice had full access to his own bank accounts and all the opportunity to introduce evidence to disprove the data, findings and analysis presented by the Ombudsman or the report of the AMLC, the Defense did not introduce any such evidence.

As it is, the Impeachment Court could only rely on the documents supplied by the Ombudsman which show the Respondent’s bank transactions but which do not show the actual bank balances of Respondent’s bank accounts.

Instead, the Defense presented the Chief Justice himself as its last witness and pleaded for the Court’s permission to allow the Respondent to deliver an “opening statement”.

This Court, out of courtesy to the Chief Justice, decided to extend its understanding and to exercise liberality in granting the request.

The long narration, where the Chief Justice touched on a wide range of issues, assertions of facts, accusations, opinions and personal sentiments, which the Respondent said he found necessary to narrate in order to clear his and his family’s name, was later adopted by the Defense as the direct testimony of the Respondent. The Prosecution, on the other hand, waived its right to cross-examine the Chief Justice, provided the Defense would not conduct any further direct examination.

Nevertheless, the Respondent Chief Justice testified and admitted, in answer to questions from a member of this Court, that he had around P80 Million in 3 Peso accounts and US$2.4 Million in 4 US Dollar accounts, but that he had purposely not declared these assets for 2 reasons: (1) That his Peso accounts represented “co-mingled funds”, and (2) That he was not required to report or declare his foreign currency deposits in his SALN because they were absolutely confidential under R.A. 6426.

I disagree on both counts.

If, indeed, any of the Respondent’s cash deposits were co-mingled with the funds belonging to other parties such as the Basa Guidote Enterprises, Inc. (BGEI) or his children, the Respondent was still duty bound to declare these deposits in his SALN, they being admittedly under his name.

The evidence is devoid of any indication that the Chief Justice was holding these funds in trust for or that they were actually beneficially owned by any one other than himself or his wife.

Assuming that any part of such deposits in truth belonged to third parties, the Respondent could have indicated such third-party funds as corresponding liabilities in his SALN. That would have reflected his real net worth.

With all due respect, I believe that the Respondent Chief Justice’s reliance on the absolute confidentiality accorded to foreign currency deposits under Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426 is grossly misplaced.

The Constitution, in Article XI, Sec. 17, provides that “A public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of office and as often as may be required by law, submit a declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities and net worth. x x x ”

Are we now to say that this Constitutional command is limited to a public official’s assets or deposits in local currency? If so, would we not be saying, in effect, that the Constitution allows something less than a full, honest and complete disclosure?

It bears noting that the prescribed form of the SALN quite simply requires public officers and employees to declare their assets, real and personal, the latter to include cash and bank deposits, bonds, etc. It does not require the public officer or employee to indicate whether or not he or she has foreign currency notes or deposits. Neither does it require details such as account numbers, account names, bank identity nor any branch address. All that it requires is a declaration of the total amount of the funds deposited in any bank account or accounts maintained by the public official or employee concerned.

Surely, the Chief Justice knows the equivalent value in local currency of his foreign currency deposits to be able to declare the same as part of his assets, especially since the aggregate amount of these foreign currency deposits, by his own account, amounts to US$2.4 Million.

The non-disclosure of these deposits, in both local and foreign currency, would naturally result in a corresponding distortion of the Chief Justice’s real net worth.

Consistent with the position taken by this Court in the case filed by the Philippine Savings Bank before the Supreme Court last February, pursuant to which the Supreme Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order, I maintain that the Constitutional principle of public accountability overrides the absolute confidentiality of foreign currency deposits.

The provisions of R.A. 6426 cannot be interpreted as an exception to the unequivocal command and tenor of Article XI, Sec. 17, of the 1987 Constitution, and I regret that the Highest Magistrate of the land, no less, would think otherwise.

Section 8 of R.A. 6426 provides that except with the written permission of the depositor, “in no instance shall foreign currency deposits be examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government official, bureau or office whether judicial or administrative or legislative or any other entity whether public or private.”

The so-called conflict of laws between R.A. Nos. 6713 and 6426 is more illusory than real. Section 8 of R.A. No. 6426 merely prohibits the examination, inquiry or looking into a foreign currency deposit account by an entity or person other than the depositor himself. But there is nothing in R.A. No. 6426 which prohibits the depositor from making a declaration on his own of such foreign currency funds, especially in this case where the Constitution mandates the depositor who is a public officer to declare all assets under oath.

Some have raised the question: Why should the Chief Justice be held accountable for an offense which many, if not most others in Government are guilty of, perhaps even more than he is? They say that hardly anyone declares his true net worth anyway.

Here lies what many have posited as a moral dilemma. I believe it is our duty to resolve this “dilemma” in favor of upholding the law and sound public policy. If we were to agree with the Respondent that he was correct in not disclosing the value of his foreign currency deposits because they are absolutely confidential, can we ever expect any SALN to be filed by public officials from hereon to be more accurate and true than they are today?

I am not oblivious to the possible political repercussions of the final verdict we are called upon to render today. I am deeply concerned that the people may just so easily ignore, forget, if not completely miss out, the hard lessons we all must learn from this episode, instead of grow and mature as citizens of a democratic nation.

Those whose intentions and motivations may be farthest from the lofty ideals of truth and justice are wont to feast upon this man’s downfall should this Court render a guilty verdict.

I am equally aware of the tremendous pressure weighing heavily upon all the members of this Court as we had to come to a decision on this case, one way or the other.

But to render a just verdict according to my best lights and my own conscience is a sacred duty that I have sworn to perform.

As one who has been through many personal upheavals through all of my 88 years, I, too, have been judged, often unfairly and harshly. But I have constantly held that those who face the judgment of imperfect and fallible mortals like us have recourse to the judgment of history, and, ultimately, of God.

And so, with full trust that the Almighty will see us through the aftermath of this chapter in our nation’s history, I vote to hold the Chief Justice, Renato C. Corona, GUILTY as charged under Article II, Par. 2.3, and that his deliberate act of excluding substantial assets from his sworn Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth constitutes a culpable violation of the Constitution.

my 2010 photo with former chief justice R.Puno with the sticker "NO TO MIDNIGHT CHIEF JUSTICE"

 (After 43 trial days and hundreds of grueling hours of hearing, the Senate sitting as impeachment court have declared Chief Justice Renato Corona guilty May 29, 2012. 

Corona Trial: Maid in the Philippines..

One quotable quote that struck me during the almost three hour opening statement cum direct testimony of Chief Justice Renato Corona in the impeachment trial is about household helpers or maids.

“Simpleng buhay at tahahan lamang. Hindi man kami gumagamit ng aircon sapagkat napakadali naming magkasakit sa lamig. Simpleng pagkain lamang ang kinakain namin sa bahay. Sa maniwala man kayo o hindi, kami po ay walang katulong sa bahay,” Corona said.

In essence, CJ Corona said that they were able to save money during the early years of their marriage by the fact that, among others,  they did not hire maids.
I asked my officemate: did i hear it right? The Corona family  has no maids?

I guess his statement will have a  badge of truth if the Corona family lived abroad. But realistically speaking, very seldom do you encounter a middle income family in the Philippines that has no maid in their household, moreso if you have growing children. What more in the case of Corona, as he said his financial status is a product of hard work. Moreover, he admitted that his wife came from a buena familia. So how can one believe in such statement that they did not hire any maid? Another question that came to my mind is: how much do they pay their maids that he cited them as a defense in the trial? Are  they receiving lucrative salaries that they become  significant  materials in the issue of the dollar bank accounts and SALN?  Under this premise,  I guess, they must be earning more than what i was earning during the early years of my legal practice.I am in  wrong profession, perhaps.

An article of the same tenor expounded further pointed inconsistency in Corona's testimony that  his family lives a simple life,  Corona’s reimbursements in the Supreme Court tell a different story. He dined in fancy restaurants and wore expensive Barong Tagalog, among others. Among the documents that the prosecution panel has  are the following:
 
* Corona's reimbursement of P15,362.37 for a meal at Century Tsukiji restaurant on June 20, 2010. The receipt was under the name “Renato/Cristina Corona.”

* Corona's reimbursement of P20,400 and P25,000 for Barong Tagalog purchased at Rustan’s store Design Exchange Corp.

* A reimbursement of P100,000 for the “purchase Christmas gifts of the Chief Justice”

Receipts of his reimbursements were part of the evidence that various commercial institutions submitted to the Senate impeachment court based on a request from the prosecution.

Article 3 of the impeachment complaint accuses Corona of “failing to meet and observe the stringent standards… that provides that “a member of the judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence.”

“Respondent reportedly dipped his hands into public funds to finance personal expenses. Numerous personal expenses that have nothing to do with the discharge of his official functions, such as lavish lunches and dinners, personal travels and vacations, and fetes and parties, have reportedly been charged by the Respondent to judicial funds. In essence, Respondent has been reportedly using the judicial fund as his own personal expense account, charging to the Judiciary personal expenditures,” reads the complaint.

The prosecution did not present them as evidence anymore after presiding officer Juan Ponce Enrile barred them from discussing peripheral allegations.

Legally speaking, the domestic worker  is the person, commonly under a livein employment arrangement with his/her employer, providing household services. He/she is traditionally referred to in many ways such as “katulong,” “chimay or chimoy,” “boy,” “tsuper,” “yaya,”
“maid,” “DH”, “domestic or household helper,” or “servant,” among others. The more humane reference to the domestic worker is “kasambahay” which literally means house companion and such
other references like “kuya,” “manang,” or “inday”.Many domestic workers are migrants from the provinces or poverty areas of the country.

The Labor Code defines the domestic worker in terms of the domestic or household service he/she is expected to render. This covers services in the employer’s home which is usually necessary or

desirable for the maintenance and enjoyment thereof and includes ministering to the personal comfort and convenience of the members of the employer’s household, including services of family drivers.The Labor Code has one chapter devoted to “Employment of Househelpers” that describes who the househelpers are, how they should be paid and treated during and even after their services are no longer needed. The chapter is made up of twelve articles or parts (from Article 141 to 152).

In 2011, the economic NGO  Ibon said Filipino domestic household workers in the Philippines and abroad contributed at least P167.4 billion in services and remittances to the economy . Ibon said there were 3.25 million domestic help employed in the country and abroad in 2011, Ibon said the value of services rendered by domestic household workers was estimated by multiplying their number by their P140.89 average daily basic pay, taken from the Labor Force Survey (LFS), by 365 days of the year.This resulted in an average daily basic pay worth P100.3 billion. This was used by Ibon as a proxy of the economic value of their services. The remittances from domestic household workers overseas was estimated by multiplying Ibon’s estimate of 1.3 million working abroad by an assumed remittance of $100 or P4,300 per month, for a total of P167.4 billion.

 In the Philippines, household workers receive only half of the minimum wage in the National Capital Region, while the rest of the country only pays them 45 percent of the minimum wage.According to the ILO in the Philippines, about half of domestic helpers work more than 10 hours a day.

In 2010 , the Senate approved on third and final reading the Senate version of the Kasambahay bill, which stipulates that employers need to pay their domestic helpers at least P2,500 if they are within Metro Manila; at least P2,000 if they are in first class municipalities; and at least P1,500 for those in third class municipalities.Senator Jinggoy Estrada, who heads the labor committee in the upper chamber, has earlier lambasted the House of Representatives for failing to act on the House version of the bill.

The Maid or househelper is in fact deeprooted in Philippine history under the term "alipin". With its nearest translation as "servant" or "slave," people belonging to this social class are not completely free, although they enjoyed some benefits to barangay land - they had rights to food, shelter and work. If situation calls for it, an alipin could lose his or her rank and rights, for instance, when he or she committed a heinous crime, but was not executed. A person became an alipin when he or she was captured from the war, punished for a crime, unable to pay debts, bought as a slave or born illegitimately. The class also include those born and raise by parents of the alipin class, especially those who have parents who died with unpaid debts.

There are two types of alipin - the namamahay and the sagigilid (or saguiguilid).

• Aliping Namamahay, translated as "householder," refers to an alipin who enjoyed rights and privileges to land, had his or her own house that are usually within the domain or territory of his or her master. In a sense, people belonging in this subclass were actually free, however their status was not permanent. A person became a namamahay when he or she is demoted from a higher rank, or promoted from being a sagigilid. He or she paid tribute or buwis which depends on his or her arrangement from the master. When the master's children are to be married, the namamahay was obliged to offer gifts.

• Aliping Sagigilid, translated as "hearth slave", refers to those alipin not enjoying rights and privileges. Purchased slaves and those captured from wars belong to this subclass. A sagigilid was highly dependent with his or her master, since had to provide him or her with food and shelter. The master had control over the sagigilid that he can easily sell his slave to another master. When this slave married, the master need not to support his or her family, and he or she will rise to being a namamahay. A sagigilid could buy his freedom in gold - for 30 golds, he or she can be freed from his or her master; and for 90 pesos, he or she can be promoted to timawa class.

There are some websites that have employed "marketing" strategies for the Filipino maids. "There are many advantages of hiring a maid from a Filipino Maid Agency. Filipinos are known all over the word for being hard-working and trustworthy employees. They also have the natural ability to maintain a good working environment and they get along well with other nationalities. Among their many traits, Filipino maids are also known for being clean, orderly and respectful. They take pride on their honest disposition and loyalty to their employers. Their patience is unmatched making them an ideal household member.A Filipino maid can be trusted with anything and knows how to draw the line between being a household employee and a dependable carer to all the members of the family. More than that, she is willing to take the extra mile by doing extra tasks in the home that are beyond her duties. If her duty is just to clean the house or do the laundry, she can go as far as tending the garden as well, looking after the kids or even running some errands."

Is the maid  capable of being a world leader? Some do think so." Should the domestic maid be the one to rule the world, tidiness and orderliness shall dominate humanity.This can be one rule where no house, streets and establishments would be dirty. The maid values cleanliness after all and it is something that takes effort, so a punishment should be given to all violators. The most important values would be hard work, honesty and love for God and family. It does not take to be a maid to have all of these but maids are inclined to have good values despite less attention. If they can have it their way and create their own rules, it may still be a wonderful clean and stress-free world. "

The Impeachment trial's "hear no evil" fiasco, who is wrong?

"Then you’re not from UP. Then you cannot equate yourself to          me because there is a saying and I know this, not all law students      are created equal, not all law schools are created equal, not all             lawyers are created equal despite what the Supreme Being that we        all are created equal in His form and substance."

These are the statements that prompted Atty. Melvin D.C. Mane to   charge Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen of Branch 36, RTC Calamba City, of “demeaning, humiliating and berating” him during the hearing on February 27, 2006 because he is a "MLQU" graduate.

The  Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)  earlier ruled that  "Respondent judge’s insulting statements which tend to question complainant’s capability and credibility stemming from the fact that the latter did not graduated [sic] from UP Law school is clearly unwarranted and inexcusable. When a judge indulges in intemperate language, the lawyer can return the attack on his person and character, through an administrative case against the judge, as in the instant case."A judge’s official conduct and his behavior in the performance of judicial duties should be free from the appearance of impropriety and must be beyond reproach. A judge must at all times be temperate in his language.

On its Decision dated June 30, 2008, in A.M. No. RTJ-08-2119,  the Supreme Court  imposed upon the erring judge the penalty of reprimand under the following principle.

 "An alumnus of a particular law school has no monopoly of knowledge of the law. By hurdling the Bar Examinations which this Court administers, taking of the Lawyer’s oath, and signing of the Roll of Attorneys, a lawyer is presumed to be competent to discharge his functions and duties as, inter alia, an officer of the court, irrespective of where he obtained his law degree.  For a judge to determine the fitness or competence of a lawyer primarily on the basis of his alma mater is clearly an engagement in an argumentum ad hominem. A judge must address the merits of the case and not on the person of the counsel.  If respondent felt that his integrity and dignity were being “assaulted,” he acted properly when he directed complainant to explain why he should not be cited for contempt.  He went out of bounds, however, when he, as the above-quoted portions of the transcript of stenographic notes show, engaged on a supercilious legal and personal discourse.  This Court has reminded members of the bench that even on the face of boorish behavior from those they deal with, they ought to conduct themselves in a manner befitting gentlemen and high officers of the court Judges should always be aware that disrespect to lawyers generates disrespect to them. There must be mutual concession of respect. Respect is not a one-way ticket where the judge should be respected but free to insult lawyers and others who appear in his court. Patience is an essential part of dispensing justice and courtesy is a mark of culture and good breeding. If a judge desires not to be insulted, he should start using temperate language himself; he who sows the wind will reap a storm.It is also noticeable that during the subject hearing, not only did respondent judge make insulting and demeaning remarks but he also engaged in unnecessary “lecturing” and “debating”. . .Thus, it is our view that respondent judge should shun from lecturing the counsels or debating with them during court hearings to prevent suspicions as to his fairness and integrity."

          

A revisit on  above ruling is very timely due  to the incident that occurred last week as a member of the Senate, Miriam Santiago, used abusive language in an impeachment proceeding, on live TV, and no one in the Senate has raised issue over her actuations. By placing his cupped hands over his “hurt ears” while in full view of cameras,prosecutor Vitaliano Aguirre II caught the ire of Santiago. However, he lectured back to the lecturing legislator, telling Santiago “If you demand respect, respect also these lawyers because human dignity has no equal.”

A posting from the facebook group  "You Know You are from UP LAW"  said  that "If the Philippine Senate were made of men and women of character, Miriam Santiago should have been  slapped with a disciplinary action at the same time that Aguirre of the hear-no-evil fame was held for contempt. Is the Senate any better -- or any worse -- than than the Supreme Court in protecting its own? Actions speak louder than words. It's really about who holds the power. In this country, as current history shows, those who hold the most power -- in the Executive, Legislative and Judicial branches of government -- treat that power as something to be abused as a matter of right."

In May 2007, the Supreme Court in A.M. No. RTJ-05-1955 admonished a judge to “maintain composure and equanimity” and “always be temperate, patient and courteous both in conduct and language” because “as a dispenser of justice” a judge “should exercise judicial temperament at all times, avoiding vulgar and insulting language.A judge, even on the face of boorish behavior from those he deals with, ought to conduct himself in a manner befitting a gentleman and a high officer of the court.”

Another posting i saw was from the October 15th Episode of The People's ,Court  Judge Milian gives a University of Miami law student a piece of her mind after he disrespects her.